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SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: A MODEST
PROPOSAL TO REVISE FEDERAL RULE 23.1

Robert A. Kessler*

The purpose of this article is to suggest the addition of two
words, "if necessary"-or better yet, the phrase "if necessary

under the law of the forum state"-to clause (1) of Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23.1.1 This Rule sets forth the requirements

for a shareholder's derivative action 2 in the federal courts.
*Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. A.B., 1949, Yale College; J.D.,
1952, Columbia University; LL.M., 1959, New York University.
1 Rule 23.1 currently provides that:
In a derivative action brought by one or more shareholders or members to
enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated association, the
corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may properly be asserted by it. the complaint shall be verified and shall allege (1) that the
plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time of the transaction of which
he complains or that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law, and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer
jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise
have. The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or
comparable authority and, if necessary, from the shareholders or members,
and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the
effort. The derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the
plaintiff does not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or members similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. The action shall not be dismissed or compromised
without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or
compromise shall be given to shareholders or members in such manner as the
court directs.
It is interesting to note that the current Rule does not expressly require the plaintiff to
allege that he is presently a shareholder. See deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d
1223, 1227 (10th Cir. 1970). This requirement is made explicit in N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 626(b) (McKinney 1963). See generally 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 824, at 228-29 (1940).
To make it clear that the purpose of the amendment is to adopt the essential policy of
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (A federal judge in a diversity case should
decide exactly as his state court counterpart would.), the language could perhaps be further
clarified by adding the wording: "if necessary under the law which the forum state would
apply." The "state judge role" test is set forth in Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754 (1 st
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940) and Griffen v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498
(1941).
Applying the law of the forum state, as proposed, generally accords with federal
treatment of related security-for-expenses statutes. See H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS

784,
n.9 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as HENN].
2

See generally H. BALLANTINE, LAW OF CORPORATIONS ch. 11 (rev. ed. 1946) [hereinafter cited as BALLANTINE]; HENN, supra note 1, at 749-53; N. LATTIN, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS ch. 8 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as LATTIN].
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As thus amended, the Rule would require the shareholder commencing such an action to allege: "(1) [only if necessary under the
law of the forum state] that the plaintiff was a shareholder or
member at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his share or membership thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law ...
" The object of the proposed change is, of
course, to incorporate state law into the contemporaneous share
ownership requirement imposed by the Rule on plaintiffs bringing
actions in behalf of their corporations.
if adopted, the revision will have a twofold effect: first, it will
allow a shareholder, even though he purchased his shares after the
wrongdoing for which he seeks a recovery for the corporation, to
maintain the action in the federal courts of those states where he
would be allowed to do so in the state court, i.e., to use the
practitioner's terms, a "subsequent shareholder" will be allowed
to sue. Second, and more importantly, it will permit intervention
of noncontemporaneous shareholders and aggregation of their
shareholdings for the purpose of avoiding a statutory requirement
that plaintiffs post security where they do not own a certain
percentage, or value, of the corporation's outstanding shares.
Although, as is usual in such matters, the decisions are not in
complete agreement, the prevailing interpretation of the Rule as
presently phrased ignores contrary state practice in both situations. 3 It is submitted that this interpretation is not only incorrect, but may even be unconstitutional, and that the Rule itself
may be void as exceeding the Supreme Court's rulemaking power.
If any of these contentions is correct, the Rule must be amended.
It is further submitted that even if the Rule is not void, it should
still be amended in order to overrule these anti-state law decisions
because they are inconsistent with the federal policy expressed in
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 4 in other Federal Rules, and in
Rule 23.1 itself. The ultimate argument for the proposed amendment is, as it always should be, that the change will do justice, in
this case by providing a forum for redressing state-created claims
where no state court may be able to do so.
This article discusses the present Rule and its interpretation,
examines the arguments put forth by authorities who favor the
status quo, and explores the arguments advanced here for the
proposed change.

3

See notes 17, 27-28, 38 and accompanying text infra.

4304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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I. THE PRESENT RULE AND ITS INTERPRETATION

A. History
Rule 23.1 is the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governing
shareholder derivative actions. It imposes a number of requirements on a shareholder plaintiff bringing an action to vindicate
corporate rights where the corporation refuses to do so.
In addition to requiring a demand on the directors and "if
necessary" on the shareholders, or suitable excuses where such
demand has not been made, conditioning the action on the typical
class action showing of adequate representation, and limiting the
settlement of derivative actions, the Rule requires the verified
complaint to allege:
(1) that the plaintiff was a shareholder or member at the time
of the transaction of which he complains or that his share or
membership thereafter devolved on him by operation of law,
and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdication on a court of the United States which it would not
5
otherwise have.
The Rule was adopted by the Supreme Court in 1966 on the
6
recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
7
appointed by the Chief Justice pursuant to statutory authorization given to the Judicial Conference of the United States, of
which the Chief Justice is Chairman, to make a continuous study
of the Federal Rules.8 Although the Advisory Committee's explanatory notes regarding amendments to other Rules adopted at
the same time were frequently quite elaborate, all that was said
about new Rule 23, 1 was:
A derivative action by a shareholder of a corporation or by
a member of an unincorporated association has distinctive
aspects which require the special provisions set forth in the
new rule. The next-to-the-last sentence recognizes that the
question of adequacy of representation may arise when the
plaintiff is one of a group of shareholders or members. Cf. 3
Moore's Federal Practice, par. 23.08 (2d ed. 1963).
The court has inherent power to provide for the conduct of
the proceedings in a derivative action, including the power to
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(1).
6 Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARV. L. REV. 356, 386-87 (1967).
7 See announcement of the Chief Justice of the United States, Apr. 4, 1960.
8
Act of July 11, 1958, Pub.L, No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331
(1970)).
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determine the course of the proceedings and require that any
appropriate notice be given to shareholders or members.9
The Advisory Committee's comment sheds little light on the
purpose of the particular requirements of the Rule, and on their
proper interpretation.
Rule 23.1 is a "spin-of' from old Rule 23(b), under which most
of the cases were decided, and which read:
(b) Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action
brought to enforce a secondary right on the part of one or
more shareholders in an association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association refuses to enforce rights
which may properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall be
verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was a
shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law and (2) that the action is not a collusive one to
confer on a court of the United States jurisdiction of any
action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The
complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of
the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees
and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he
desires, and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action
or the reasons for not making such effort. 10
Manifestly, the requirement of allegations of both share ownership and noncollusion are identical in the old and new Rules.
The meaning of the pleading requisites is plain enough in a
single plaintiff action. The notes of the 1946 Advisory Committee,
which recommended retention of Rule 23(b) in the form it kept
until the spin-off, reveal the Rule's history, its purpose, and the
problems that it raised. Since the revised Rule carries over the
substance of the old one, these comments are significant in the
interpretation of the new one.

The Note 1 ' gives the history of the Rule, and, rather sur9

3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.1.01 [61,
at 23.1-17 (2d ed. 1969) [hereinafter

cited as MOORE].

'ld. 23.1.01[51, at 23.1-16 to -17. A portion of old Rule 23(c) also applied to
derivative actions. Rule 23(c) read:
c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be
enforced is one defined in paragraph (I) of subdivision (a) of this rule notice
of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is one defined in
paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be given only if the court
requires it.
Id. 23.01 [I], at 23-17.
11The complete text of the Committee's Note is reproduced in MOORE, supra note 9.
23.1.01 [4], at 23.1- 12 to- 16.
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prisingly, itself raises the question of the constitutionality of the
Rule's contemporaneous ownership requirement under the Erie
doctrine, which requires federal courts to apply state substantive
law in diversity cases. As the Note puts it:
If it is a matter of substantive law or right, then under Erie
R. Co. v. Tompkins clause (1) may not be validly applied in
cases pending in states whose local law permits a shareholder
to maintain such actions, although not a shareholder at the
time of the transactions complained of.12
The Note goes on to discuss the cases decided prior to 1946
and the state statutes similar to the Rule, continuing to focus on
the "substance versus procedure" problem raised by Erie. The
history of the Rule, even though spanning a long time, is simple.
As the Committee indicates:
In Hawes v. Oakland (1882) 104 U.S. 450, the Court held

that a shareholder could not maintain such an action unless
he owned shares at the time of the transactions complained
of, or unless they devolved on him by operation of law. At
that time the decision in Swift v. Tyson (1842) 16 Peters 1,

was the law, and the federal courts considered themselves
free to establish their own principles of equity jurisprudence,
so the Court was not in 1882 and has not been, until Erie R.
Co. v. Tompkins in 1938, concerned with the question whether Hawes v. Oakland dealt with substantive right or procedure.
Following the decision in Hawes v. Oakland, and at the

same term, the Court, to implement its decision, adopted
Equity Rule 94, which contained the same provision above
quoted from Rule 23 F.R.C.P. The provision in Equity Rule
94 was later embodied in Equity Rule 27. of which the
13
present Rule 23 is substantially a copy.
Cases interpreting the predecessor of Rule 23(b), according to
the Note, treat the Hawes rule as establishing a "principle" of
equity, as dealing not with jurisdiction but with the "right" to
maintain an action, or as saying that the defense under the equity
rule is analogous to the defense that the plaintiff has no "title,"
therefore resulting in a dismissal "for want of equity." This interpretation would suggest, albeit weakly, that the Rule is substantive. The Note concludes by saying that the more recent
cases show the question to be a debatable one, and although there
12

ld. at 23.1- 13.

13

Id.
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is respectable authority for either view, the recent trend is toward
14
the view that Rule 23(b) is procedural.
The Note refuses to take sides in the controversy, counseling
that the matter be "left to await a judicial decision in a litigated
case." 5 If that decision holds that the Rule is substantive, the
Note then advises that "the rule should be amended by adding a
provision that Rule 23(b)(i) does not apply in jurisdictions where
state laws permits [sic] a shareholder to maintain a secondary
action, although he was not a shareholder at .the time of the
transaction of which he complains." In short, if the Rule were
held substantive, the Note, in effect, proposes the change suggested in this article. The Supreme Court, however, has not yet
resolved the question in any litigated case.
B. Relation to the Intervention Rule
Rule 23.1 does not expressly deal with the problem of a shareholder who wishes to join in prosecuting an already pending
derivative action. Intervention, the procedure whereby a nonparty
has himself added as a party to a pending lawsuit, is governed in
the federal courts by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.16 In its
14 Id. at 23.1- 16.
15 Id.
16

Rule 24. as amended in 1966. reads as follows:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action: I) when a statute of the United States
confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims
an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the
action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless
the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be permitted to intervene in an action: (I) when a statute of the United Statesconfers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or
defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common. When
a party to an action relies for ground of claim or defense upon any statute or
executive order administered by a federal or state governmental officer or
agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement, or agreement issued or
made pursuant to the statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon
timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising
its discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly
delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties.
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to
intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the
grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the
claim or defense for which intervention is sought. The same procedure shall
be followed when a statute of the United States gives a right to intervene.
When the constitutionality of an act of Congress affecting the public interest
is drawn in question in any action to which the United States or an officer.
agency. or employee thereof is not a party, the court shall notify the Attorney
General of the United States as provided in Title 28. U.S.C. § 2403.
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present form, in addition to cases in which a United States statute
grants the right, the Rule allows intervention (a) of right when
"the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that
the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or
impede his ability to protect that interest," unless his interest is
already adequately represented by the existing parties; and (b) by
permission, i.e., in the discretion of the court, when the "applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of law
or fact in common."
Neither the present Rule nor its predecessors, which were less
liberal in conferring the privilege, expressly deal with intervention
in a shareholder's derivative action. Furthermore, neither the
Advisory Committee's 1966 Note nor earlier comments, are enlightening on the matter. It is generally held, nonetheless, that a
shareholder desiring to intervene on the plaintiff's side must meet
the requirements of Rule 23.1 as to share ownership at the time of
17
the transaction of which he complains.
It should be noted that this result is hardly mandated by Rule
24, which says nothing about intervention in a shareholder's derivative action, or by Rule 23.1 itself, since the latter pointedly
uses the singular "plaintiff" in imposing its requirement of contemporaneous ownership, rather than the plural "all plaintiffs."
It would, therefore, seem enough, under Rule 23.1, if any
plaintiff, either original or by intervention, was a shareholder at
the time of the alleged wrong. This interpretation is consistent
with cases allowing intervening shareholders who do meet the
contemporaneous ownership requirement to "save" an action
brought by shareholders who were not qualified under the Rule. 18
Accordingly, even if the matter is truly procedural, and hence
governed exclusively by the Federal Rules, where the action is
1"Thus. the district court in Hirshhorn v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 101 F. Supp. 549
(W.D. Pa. 1951), affd, 193 F.2d 489 (3rd Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 866 (1953),
stated:
Furthermore, it may be noted that Rule 23(b)(1) requires that a plaintiff in
a stockholder's derivative action be "a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or that his share thereafter devolved on him by
operation of law." This requirement is equally applicable to intervenors.
Winkelman v. General Motors Corporation, D.C. S.D. N.Y. 1942, 44
F. Supp. 960.See 2 Barron and Holtzoff 568 (Rules ed. 1950).
101 F. Supp. at 555.
Earlier cases on intervention were no more enlightening as to why it was necessary to
engraft the requirement of Rule 23(b)( I) onto the intervention rule. See generally MOORE,
supra note 9, 24.08 [3], at 24- 187.
18Pikor v. Cinerama Prod. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 92 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (dictum); Truncale v.
Universal Pictures Co., 76 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). See generally MOORE, supra
note 9, 24.16 [8], at 24-681 to -682.
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brought in a federal court, intervention by noncontemporaneous
shareholders should be allowed where at least the original plaintiff
or one of the intervenors can meet the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1.
C. Relation to State Security-forExpenses Statutes
A number of states have enacted security-for-expenses statutes. 19 The purpose of such statutes is to discourage "strike"
suits, 20 derivative actions brought by shareholders to harass the
management, or worse yet, to blackmail the corporation or its
directors into buying them off.2 ' Typically, security-for-expenses
19A few of these security-for-expenses statutes (CAL. CORP. CODE § 834 (West 1955),
NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.520 (1969)) allow the court to require the posting of security
irrespective of the plaintiff's shareholdings. Most statutes, however, allow the plaintiff, or
plaintiffs, to escape the requirement where he, or they, own a certain percentage of the
outstanding stock or stock having a certain value. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-4-21
(1963); FLA. STAT. § 608.131 (1956); MD. RULES CIV. P. § 328(b) (1971); NEB. REV.

STAT. § 21-2047 (1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627
(McKinney 1963), as amended, (McKinney 1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19-48 (1960);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(a) (1967); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT art. 5.14 (Supp. 1973);
WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 (1965); Wis. STAT. § 180.405 (1953). See generally 13
W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 5971.1 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1970).

The ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act §49 (1969) is of the latter variety, and, accordingly, more states can be expected to enact similar provisions in the future. The
additional interpretive problem under the Federal Rule, that of the right of an equitable
owner to ue (see note 125 infra), will be exacerbated if this is done, since the Model Act
provision restricts suit to holders "of record," i.e., denies the right to equitable owners
(although it also allows suit by holders of voting trust certificates).
It is also interesting to note that the ABA Committee's Comment to § 49 expressly
characterizes the section as "procedural." 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 33 (1971).
This will pose no insoluble interpretive problem for federal courts, since many rules
characterized as "procedural" under state law are considered "substantive" for Erie
purposes. See, e.g., Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99 (1945). It may, however, confuse judges and lawyers who are still hesitant to
accept the propositions that laws can be both "substantive" and "procedural" at the same
time, and that the determination of whether a particular rule is to be applied in a federal
court does not depend on a simplistic dichotomy between the two categories.
Minor problems, which could be resolved by a simple directive in the Federal Rule to
apply state law in this entire area, but which, under the present phrasing of the Rule, may
generate interpretative difficulty, can arise under statutes such as those of Pennsylvania
and Texas. The former excuses the contemporaneity requirement where the plaintiff shows
a "strong prima facie case in favor of the claim asserted on behalf of the corporation and
that without such suit serious injustice will result" (PA. STAT. tit. 15, § 15 16(a) (1967)).
and the latter provides that the security-for-expenses statute is not to affect the right
granted under the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure that allows a person to make an affidavit
of inability to give security. (TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT, art. 5.14 (Supp. 1973)). See generally
2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 29-87 (1971).
The history and purpose of the security-for-expenses statutes are discussed in HENN,
supra note

I,

at 781-86 and W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 930-38

(4th ed. 1969). See also McClure v. Borne Chem. Co,, 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
20W. CARY, supra note 19, at 931-32; HENN, supra note 1, at 752.

21 See, e.g., Clarke v. Greenberg, 296 N.Y. 146, 71 N.E.2d 443 (1947).
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statutes require a shareholder who owns insignificant amounts of
stock 2 2 to post security, where the corporation so demands, to
cover the corporation's expenses under director-indemnification
statutes. Since these statutes generally place no limit on the
amount that the court may require the plaintiff to post, 23 the
deterrent effect on plaintiffs contemplating suit is obvious.
Since the security-for-expenses statutes penalize the poor
plaintiff with a good claim, but not the rich plaintiff with a bad
claim, the wisdom of such statutes may be doubted. 24 The theory,
however, is that plaintiffs with substantial holdings are less likely

to bring frivolous suits. If the theory is correct, it should make no
difference when the plaintiffs acquired their shares, and some
25
courts have so held.
But, even where state law has allowed noncontemporaneous
intervening shareholders to make up the necessary minimum percentage or share value in order to avoid the impact of secur22

Compare, however, such statutes as those of California and Nevada, cited in note 19
supra.
23
See HENN, supra note 1,at 784: MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.15[3], at 23.1-85. But
cf.2 CAL.
CORP. CODE § 834 (West 1955).
4

See MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.15[3], at 23.1-82 to -85; Hornstein, New, Aspects of
Stockholders' Derivative Suits, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 1,4-7 (1947); Kessler, Corporations
and the New Federal Diversity Statute: A Denial of Justice, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 239,
257-58. It should be noted that in many states where he is excused from posting security,
the plaintiff will not be liable for expenses. even though his suit was groundless. See Tyler
v. Gas Consumers Ass'n., 35 Misc. 2d 801, 231 N.Y.S.2d 15 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Isensee v.
Long Island Motion Picture Co., 184 Misc. 625, 54 NY.S.2d 556 (Sup. Ct. 1945). See
also HENN, supra note 1.at 784.
2 Perry v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., I I Misc. 2d 137, 172 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct.), affd
mem., 6 App. Div. 1010, 178 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't). appeal denied, 7 App. Div. 634,
179 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1st Dep't 1958); Noel Associates, Inc. v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 53
N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944); HENN, supra note I. at 785.
A study of the workings of the New York security-for-expenses statute concludes that
"in most cases. the sophisticated defendant will not make the motion [tocompel posting of
security]." A significant factor in their decision, according to the study (based largely on
personal interviews), is the necessity of making the shareholder list available to the plaintiff
when such a motion is made. Note, Security for Expenses in Shareholders' Derivative
Suits: 23 Years' Experience, 4 COLUM. J.L. AND SOCIAL PROB. 50. 64 (1968). However, it

was this author's understanding, based on discussions with practitioners, that "sophisticated" defendants merely deferred making the motion until it appeared that the real
defendants, i.e. directors, would lose, since under N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 627, the motion
can be made by the corporation at any time before final judgment. Even if the study is
correct, however, in Ne.w York the effect on case results of the First Judicial Department
rule allowing noncontemporaneous shareholders to intervene cannot be discounted. See
note 3 1 infra. Furthermore, in the other states which can be -expected to enact security-for-expenses statutes now that they have received Model Act approbation, defendants
may not be so "sophisticated." Accordingly, the importance of these statutes and their
interpretation should not be underestimated.
It should also be noted that the results of the study might well have been distorted by
the fact that prior to the decision in Stern v. South Chester Tube Co.. 389 U.S. 911
(1968), disclosure of the shareholder list could have been avoided by removal to the
federal court (As to the old rule, see Neuwirth v. Merin, 267 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1967), holding the federal courts powerless to order examination of the shareholder list.).
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ity-for-expenses statutes,2 6 the federal courts generally have imposed the contemporaneity requirement of Rule 23.1 on all intervenors where the purpose of intervention was to avoid these
statutes. 27 The result, of course, is to require the posting of
security where it would not be mandated under state law.
This result can be justified by characterizing the requirement of
Rule 23.1 as procedural, 28 but this is no answer to the problem
since the Rule must be procedural to be valid in the first place.
However, since the Rule itself only requires the plaintiff (singular)
to be a contemporaneous owner, and says nothing about intervenors, the federal courts' requirement is not compelled by the
Rule.
A leading case adopting the "procedural" rationale is Kaufman
v. Wolfson. 29 In Kaufman the court said:
In the instant case plaintiffs rely on the substantive state
law that the claim can be maintained by plaintiffs who own in
the aggregate $50,000 worth of stock and all but one of whom
purchased their stock subsequent to the alleged injury. If, as
was said in the Cohen opinion, Rule 23(b) prevents suit in the
federal court by a group of subsequent purchasers all by
themselves even though the state law would have permitted
it, I can perceive no reason why Rule 23(b) should not prevent suit in the federal court by a group of subsequent purchasers and one contemporaneous owner even though the
state law would have permitted it.
If the question of adding plaintiffs to make up a requisite
aggregate value of stock held by plaintiffs had never come up,
no one would have had the temerity to argue that Rule 23(b)
F.R.C.P. permitted the joinder of plaintiffs who did not own
stock at the time of the alleged injury. The mere fact that the
New York courts construe the New York statutes as permitting such joinder for the purpose of making up the requisite $50,000 worth, has no tendency to alter the construction
30
of Rule 23(b).
Thus, the court superimposed the contemporaneous ownership
26 Intervention is generally allowed to avoid the security requirements of such statutes.
See Baker v. McFadden Publications, Inc., 300 N.Y. 325, 90 N.E.2d 876 (1950); Annot.,
69 A.L.R.2d 562, 576 (1960).
27 See, e.g. Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Kaufman v. Wolfson,
136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Piccard v. Sperry Corp. 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d
328 (2d Cir. 1941). Contra, Fuller v. American Mach. & Foundry Co., 95 F. Supp. 764
(S.D.N.Y. 195 1). See generally HENN, supra note 1, at 786.
28 HENN, supranote I, at 786.
29 136 F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
30
Id. at 941.
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requirement of the Federal Rule on the New York security-for-expenses statute, despite its concession that this decision
31
was contrary to New York substantive law.
In reaching its result the Kaufman court relied on Cohen v.
Beneficial IndustrialLoan Corp.,32 which the court interpreted as
stating "in effect that, despite substantive state law that the claim
could be maintained by plaintiffs who purchased their stock subsequent to the alleged injury, Rule 23(b) F.R.C.P. had the effect
of prohibiting the maintenance of the claim in the federal
."33
court. ...

It is submitted that this represents a serious overstatement of
the Cohen case. That famous case, decided in the heyday of the
"outcome determinative" interpretation of Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 34 "whereby in diversity cases the federal court administers the state system of law in all matters except details related
to its own conduct of business," 35 merely held that the New
Jersey security-for-expenses statute had to be applied by a federal
court sitting in New Jersey.
The reference in Cohen to Rule 23(b) was simply a response to
the plaintiff's argument that the New Jersey statute was only
procedural, and that, because the Federal Rule set forth the
procedure to be followed in a derivative suit in federal courts, the
state rule should not apply. The Court avoided having to choose
between the two rules, by holding that there was no conflict
between them, 3 6 and, accordingly, that both could be applied. The
Court in Cohen did not pass judgment on a situation where state
law would have allowed suit by a noncontemporaneous shareholder, i.e., where there was a conflict between state law and the
Federal Rule. What Mr. Justice Jackson actually stated was:
31 Ironically. a later New York State court decision, Richman v. Felmus. 8 App. Div. 2d
985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1959), interpreted the New York statute to impose the
same requirement of contemporaneous ownership on all intervenors. The present state of
the law in New York is uncertain. In the Second Department contemporaneous ownership
is required, while in the First Department it is not. Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30
Misc. 2d 408, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct. 1961); Noel Associates. Inc. v. Merrill. 184
Misc. 646, 53 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944). A provision in an earlier version of the
Business Corporation Law (A. Int. 885. Pr. 885, § 6.26(d) (1961) ),which would have
expressly overruled Richman v. Felmus (see 1961 N.Y. Leg. Doc. No. 12, at 43-44
Supp.), was omitted from the law as finally enacted.
32337

U.S. 541 (1949).

136 F. Supp. at 941.
34 304 U.S. 64 (1938). The phrase "outcome determinative" originated with Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
35 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555 (1949).
36 Id. at 556. The Kaufman case concedes that the New Jersey statute involved in
Cohen contained a "time of ownership" provision substantially similar to the Federal
Rule. 136 F. Supp. at 940.
33
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It is urged, however, that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
No. 23 deals with plaintiff's right to maintain such an action
in federal court and that therefore the subject is recognized as
procedural and the federal rule alone prevails.
Rule 23 requires the stockholder's complaint to be verified
by oath and to show that the plaintiff was a stockholder at the
time of the transaction of which he complains or that his
share thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law. In
other words, the federal court will not permit itself to be used
to litigate a purchased grievance or become a party to speculation in wrongs done to corporations. It also requires a
showing that an action is not a collusive one to confer jurisdiction and to set forth the facts showing that the plaintiff has
endeavored to obtain his remedy through the corporation
itself. It further provides that the class action shall not be
dismissed or compromised without approval of the court,
with notice to the members of the class. These provisions
neither create nor exempt from liabilities, but require complete disclosure to the court and notice to the parties in
interest. None conflict with the statute in question and all
may be observed by a federal court, even if not applicable in
state court.
We see no reason why the policy stated in Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct.1464, 89
37
L.Ed. 2079,160 A.L.R. 1231, should not apply.

The Supreme Court has supplied no more definitive statement
on the subject than that provided in the Cohen case, it has never
answered the question of whether intervenors under state security-for-expenses statutes must be contemporaneous owners, or,
for that matter, whether this is required of intervenors in shareholder derivative suits generally.
As a result of the Supreme Court's silence, the effect of state
law on the rights of both noncontemporaneous plaintiffs and
intervenors has been left to formulation by lower federal courts.
D. Present Status of the Rule- The

Results of Lower Court Formulation
Most federal courts require the plaintiff in a shareholder's derivative suit to have been a shareholder at the time of the alleged
wrong, or to have received his shares by operation of law from
one who was a contemporaneous shareholder, even though the

37337 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).
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state court would not impose the requirement. 3 8 It can be argued
that the matter is not of too great importance, since so many
states have similar court rules or statutes,3 9 and others have
adopted the requirement by judicial decision as a "sound and
wholesome principle of equity," in that it prevents a person from
40
buying a lawsuit.
It may be conceded that it is undesirable to allow a person to
buy shares in a corporation solely for the purpose of bringing a
derivative action. 4 1 Similarly it would be unfair to allow a purchaser of a business to use such an action as a method for
obtaining a rebate on the purchase price. 42 Since, however, a
shareholder's derivative action is an equitable one, there are other
techniques for preventing such abuses that are as satisfactory as a

38 Elkins v. Bricker. 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956): Kaufman v. Wolfson. 136
F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Bankers Nat'l Corp. v. Barr. 7 F.R.D. 305 (S.D.N.Y.
1945); Perrott v. United States Banking Corp.. 53 F. Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.. 44 F. Supp. 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Piccard v. Sperry Corp..
36 F. Supp. 1006, 1009 (S.D.N.Y.). affd, 120 F.2d 328 (2nd Cir. 1941): Lissauer v.
Bertles. 37 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1940): Robbins v. Sperry Corp.. I F.R.D, 220
(S.D.N.Y. 1940). Contra, Henis v. Compania Agricola de Guatemala, 116 F Supp. 223
(D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 210 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1954); Fuller v. American Mach. & Foundry
Co.. 95 F. Supp, 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Sometimes the choice has been unnecessary. e.g.,
where state law and federal law were the same: Western Tool & Mfg. Co.. 142 F.2d 404
(6th Cir. 1944), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100 (1945);
Bauer v. Servel, Inc.. 168 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); Henis v. Compania Agricola de
Guatemala. 116 F. Supp. 223 (D. Del. 1953).affd, 210 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1954); or where
the state law was unclear: Gallup v. Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941). See generally
C. WRIGHT. HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS3 19 (2d ed. 1970)

[hereinafter

cited as WRIGHT].
39 A.

FREY, C,

MORRIS, JR., & J. CHOPER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS

491 (1966). See also MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.15[2]. at 23.1-58 n.6. Developments
(through legislation and court rules) are proceeding so rapidly in this area that it is not
inconceivable that by the time of publication of this article virtually every state will have
some provision requiring at least the original plaintiff to be a contemporaneous owner. On
the other hand, Pennsylvania, by statute, apparently allows a noncontemporaneous owner
to sue, in the discretion of court, where it appears that the plaintiff has a good claim. PA.
STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 15 16(a) (1967).
4
°See, e.g., Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber. 67 Neb. 644, 93 N.W. 1024 (1903). See also
Venner v. Great Northern Ry. 209 U.S. 24 (1908); Jepsen v. Peterson. 69 S.D. 388, 10
N.W.2d 749 (1943); MOORE, supra note 9. 23.1.15[21. at 23.1-58 n. 6; WRIGHT. supra
note 38, at 318- 19.
41 Compare. however, the prevailing view that contemporaneity is not required in suits
to compel insiders to account for "short-swing" profits under § 16b of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970). See HENN. supra note 1. at 767-68.
42See United Elec. Sec. Co. v. Louisiana Elec. Light Co., 68 F. 673, 675 (C.C.E.D. La.
1895) (dictum); Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184. 98 N.Y.S.2d
291 (1st Dep't 1950). affd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98 N.E.2d 704 (1951) (corporation cannot
prosecute an action in which recovery would be for sole benefit of stockholders all of
whom would be precluded from instituting a derivative action by the contemporaneous
ownership requirement).See also Perlman v. Feldmann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955)
(individual rather than corporate recovery allowed, in order to prevent this rebate problem).
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rigid rule of disqualification of all noncontemporaneous owners. 43
Thus in Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass,4 4 which held
that not even the corporation could bring suit where no shareholder would be qualified to do so, Justice Schientag, in dissent,
said "it may still be held on a full disclosure of the facts that,
considering the nature of the stock ownership and the manner and
circumstances under which it was acquired, there is such gross
45
inequity in the plaintiff's claim as would preclude recovery."
Participation in the wrongdoing, laches, and acquiescence have all
been held to bar suit by a subsequent shareholder, even in jurisdictions lacking the absolute disqualification rule, 46 and should be
sufficient to deter "strike"

47

suits.

Furthermore, even an accep-

tance of the wisdom of the disqualification rule does not solve the
fundamental problem of the desirability of state and federal court
congruity in those states which have not chosen to adopt the
Federal Rule.
Finally, lower court formulation of the contemporaneous ownership requirement has had its most unfortunate effects in the
security-for-expenses area. Here, state law does differ, and the
problems will increase as enactment of these statutes accelerates.
With varied and largely uninterpreted statutes waiting, the incongruity in treatment of intervening plaintiffs cannot be passed
off as inconsequential, and the results of divergence will be more
disastrous as time goes on.
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules recommended that the
Supreme Court take no action with regard to Rule 23.1 until the
problem arose in a case litigated before it. This is a counsel of
despair. If, as a shareholder has every incentive to do in order to
get a timely adjudication on the merits, one contemplating a
derivative suit procures the necessary contemporaneous owners
in order to comply with the Rule's requirement, the question of
4See Capitol Wine & Spirit Corp. v. Pokrass, 277 App. Div. 184. 190, 98 N.Y.S.2d

291, 297 (1st Dep't 1950) (Shientag, J.,dissenting). See also Perlman v. Feldmann. 219
F.2d 173, 177-78 (2d Cir. 1955). See generallyBALLANTINE, supra note 2,at 353-54.
44277 App. Div. 184, 98 N.Y.S.2d 291 (1st Dep't 1950), affd, 302 N.Y. 734, 98
N.E.2d 704 (195 1).
44 6 277 App. Div. at 190.98 N.Y.S.2d at 297.

See Russell v. Louis Melind Co.. 331 Ill. App. 182. 72 N.E.2d 869 (1947) (barring
even a bona fide transferee from bringing a derivative action where his transferor was
subject to such equitable defenses); Babcock v. Farwell. 245 11. 14. 91 N.E. 683 (1910).
See also Bank of Mill Creek v. Elk Horn Coal Corp.. 133 W. Va. 639, 57 S.E.2d 736
(1950). See generally BALLANTINE, supra note 2, at 353-54; R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONS
810- 1 (2d ed. 1949); Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 467 (1951).

47In contrast to the more flexible equitable doctrine, under the arbitrary contemporaneous ownership rule the plaintiff's motive has been held to be immaterial, so long as he
can show wrongful acts after his purchase. Mardel Sec.. Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp.,
320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 7:90

the rights of noncontemporaneous owners to bring suit becomes
moot, and, accordingly, the Supreme Court will refuse to pass on
it.48 If the shareholder is unable to comply, no sensible litigant-assuming appealability of the order 4 9 -would have the temerity to risk all the money involved in taking the matter all the
way to the Supreme Court. Thus the Advisory Committee's case
that is ripe for decision will probably never arise.
II. RETAINING THE STATUS Quo-ARGUMENTS
ADVANCED BY

Two

AUTHORITIES

Before continuing the argument in favor of the proposed
change, the opinions of two authorities who favor the status quo
should be mentioned. Hopefully, in meeting these authors' objections, some of the reasons for adoption of the proposed change
will also become clear.
Professor Charles Alan Wright, a leading authority on federal
procedure, argues that there is nothing objectionable about Rule
23.1 even though its effect may be to close the doors of the
federal courts to prospective litigants. He states:
The requirement that the plaintiff allege that he was a
shareholder at the time of the transaction complained of is
applicable in federal question cases, except where a specific
provision in a federal statute makes an exception to it. It has
led to difficulty in diversity cases, since such a requirement is
not yet universal in the states, and poses questions under the
Erie doctrine. Some courts and commentators take the view
that an allegation of this kind is unnecessary, and that plaintiff
need not have been a shareholder at the time of the transaction, if the law of the state in which suit is brought or the state
of incorporation would permit him to sue without meeting this
requirement. Most courts and writers have thought, however,
that the rule must be met regardless of state law. Though the
arguments both ways are strong, there seems especial force to
the position that the Erie doctrine does not require the federal
48

See generallyr SEC v. Medical Comm. for Human Rights, 404 U.S. 403 (1972); A.L.
Mechling Barge Lines. Inc. v. United States. 368 U.S. 324 (1961); California v. San Pablo
& Tulare R.R.. 149 U.S. 308 (1893).
49 Supreme Court review would only seem possible by writ of certiorari to the court of
appeals. 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1970). Interlocutory appeal to the court of appeals will require
both the approval of that court and of the District Judge. 28 US.C. § 1292(b) (1970). The
order is probably appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, however, as a "final decision," by
virtue of the "collateral order" doctrine. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.. 337
U.S. 541 (1949); McClure v. Borne Chem. Co.. 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.). cert. denied, 368
U.S. 939 (1961); C. WRIGHT& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1835, at 411- 12, and cases cited. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 455- 58.
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courts to entertain a suit, merely because such a suit might be
brought in the state court. 50
This is part of the increasingly popular philosophy that would
completely abolish the federal diversity jurisdiction. 5 1 The expansion of state jurisdiction through "long-arm" statutes, which

allow in personam jurisdiction over nonresidents once thought
beyond the sweep of territorially limited state power, has now
made state courts much more effective forums than in the past.

However, there are a number of situations, especially in the
shareholder derivative action area, where, unless the federal
courts with their even wider jurisdictional sweep 52 are available,
the shareholder-plaintiff and his corporation will have no court

with jurisdiction to handle the suit. 53 To take even the simplest
case, state court jurisdiction will ordinarily be impossible where a
defendant-director has committed a tort for which his liability is
sought in a state in which the corporation does no business.
Jurisdiction over the corporation cannot be obtained through the

state's long-arm statute, hence the action must fail because the
corporation for whose benefit the derivative action is brought is
54
an indispensable party.

50

WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 319 (citations omitted).
51See, e.g., Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1,4-49 (1968); Kurland, The Distribution of Judicial Power Between National and
State Courts, 8 U. CHI. L. SCHOOL RECORD 145 (1958).
52
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1401, 1695 (1970).
53
Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 74.
54
See Goer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U.S. 428 (1903); Jordan v. Hartness, 230
N.C. 718, 55 S.E.2d 484 (1949); Dean v. Kellogg, 294 Mich. 200, 292 N.W. 704 (1940);
HENN, supra note 1. at 776. In personam jurisdiction over the corporation is ordinarily
necessary. Dean v. Kellogg, supra; HENN, supra note 1. at 743. Such jurisdiction is not
obtainable unless the corporation has sufficient contacts with the state attempting to
exercise that jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The
typical long-arm statute (see, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. tit. 110 § 17(1) (1968); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 27A.701 et seq. (1962); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW & RULES § 302 (McKinney 1972);

N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 307 (McKinney 1963), as amended, (Supp 1973)), which allows
in personam jurisdiction over foreign corporations based on causes of action arising out of
the corporation's activities within the state, or on the causing of injury within the state, is
therefore unavailable in a derivative action against the beneficiary corporation, where it
does not carry on business within the state and is not licensed to do so, since, by
hypothesis, it is not a wrongdoer.
Accordingly. the state which has jurisdiction over the real defendants (the wrongdoing
directors) may be unable to secure the necessary jurisdiction over the corporation, Dean v.
Kellogg, supra, while the state which has jurisdiction over the corporation may be unable
to secure jurisdiction over the real defendants. Platt Corp. v. Platt, 17 N.Y.2d 234. 217
N.E.2d 134, 270 N.Y.S.2d 408 (1966).
These obstacles are removed in the federal courts by 28 U.S.C. § 1401. which allows
suit to be brought in any judicial district where the real defendants could have been sued
by the corporation, and by 28 U.S.C. § 1695. which allows service to be made on the
corporation in any district where it is organized or licensed to do business or is doing
business.
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Accordingly, whatever may be the wisdom of limiting the diversity jurisdiction in other areas, it seems unwise to limit access to
the federal courts in the cases governed by Rule 23.1, since such
a limitation may result in an effective denial of justice.5 5 In short,
"door-closing" is an unpersuasive argument in favor of the
present Rule and its prevailing interpretation.
With regard to noncontemporaneous intervenors, Professor
Harry Henn, a leading authority on corporate law, apparently
approves of the predominant view that disqualifies such potential
litigants. He states:
There is conflicting authority as to whether those shareholders who desire to intervene as plaintiffs in order to avoid
a security-for-expenses requirement need to qualify under
any prevailing contemporaneous share-ownership requirement so long as the original plaintiff is a contemporaneous
share-owner. The better view would seem to be that if the
original plaintiff must be a contemporaneous share-owner in
order to bring a derivative action, persons desiring to intervene as plaintiffs should be subject to the same contemporaneous share-ownership requirement 6
None of the cases cited by Henn as agreeing with what he
characterizes as the "better view" gives any policy reasons for
debarring noncontemporaneous intervenors, so we are left to
57
speculate as to why these cases represent the "better view."
A possible policy argument against allowing the intervention of
noncontemporaneous shareholders is that such a shareholder, anxious to bring an action even for harassment, can solicit at least
one contemporaneous owner to bring the action. By then intervening, the noncontemporaneous shareholder can avoid the
security-for-expenses statute and circumvent the policy of that
55The limitation of federal diversity jurisdiction is ordinarily based upon the continued
presence of another forum. Cf. WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 74. The illustration in the text

points out that such an alternative may not exist in shareholder derivative actions.
56 HENN, supra note I,at 785 (footnote omitted).
57 Id. at 785 n.20. The note reads:
Richman v. Felmus, 8 A.D.2d 985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dept. 1959);
Breswick & Co. v. Harrison Rye Realty Corp., 280 App. Div. 820, 114

N.Y.S.2d 25 (2d Dept. 1952). In Sorin v. Shahmoon Industries, Inc., 30
Misc. 2d 429, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760, 783 (Sup. Ct. 1961), the court ruled that,
under the New York contemporaneous-share-ownership statute, one suing in
a derivative action was required to be a contemporaneous owner, but that,
under the New York security-for-expenses statute, it was not necessary for

him-alone or in association with others-to have owned the required shares
in number or value to avoid posting security for expenses at the time of the
alleged wrongs, A provision in the proposed New York Business Corporation Law expressly allowing the intervention of noncontemporaneous own-

ers was eliminated.
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statute, which is the prevention of strike suits. The complete
answer is that there would be no bar to this sequence of events
under Rule 23.1 were it not for the state security-for-expenses
statutes, and accordingly, state policy, from which these statutes
arose, should be looked to for their proper interpretation. Just as
New York, which came close to adopting the rule which Henn
criticizes,5 8 could have enacted a provision expressly allowing
intervention by noncontemporaneous owners, which presumably
would have been applied in the federal courts, any state could bar
noncontemporaneous intervenors by enacting a similar statutory
provision.
As already pointed out, the basis for the typical security-for-expenses statutory exception, which dispenses with the
necessity for posting security when the plaintiff or plaintiffs own a
specified minimum percentage or dollar value of the stock,59 is the
assumption that where the stockholdings of the litigants are significant the danger of strike suits is small. If this philosophy is
correct, it should make no difference when the statutorily significant holdings were acquired. Accordingly, state decisions allowing noncontemporaneous shareholders to intervene for the pur-

58
Kessler, The New York Business Corporation Law 36 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1961).
A. Int. 885, Pr. 885, § 6.26(d) (1961) provided:
Shareholders or holders of voting trust certificates of the corporation or of
beneficial interests in such shares may be permitted to intervene as plaintiffs
in such action, whether or not they were holders thereof at the time of the
transaction complained of, and the number and value of such share or shares
represented by such interests may be counted for the purposes of section
6.27 (Security for expenses in shareholders' derivative action brought in the
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor.)
59E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §627 (McKinney Supp. 1973) provides:
§ 627. Security for expenses in shareholders' derivative action brought in the
right of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor.- In any action
specified in section 626 (Shareholders' derivative action brought in the right
of the corporation to procure a judgment in its favor), unless the plaintiff or
plaintiffs hold five percent or more of any class of the outstanding shares or
hold voting trust certificates or a beneficial interest in shares representing five
per cent or more of any class of such shares, or the shares, voting trust
certificates and beneficial interest of such plaintiff or plaintiffs have a fair
value in excess of fifty thousand dollars. the corporation in whose right such
action is brought shall be entitled at any stage of the proceedings before final
judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security for the reasonable expenses. including attorney's fees, which may be incurred by it in
connection with such action and by the other parties defendant in connection
therewith for which the corporation may become liable under this chapter.
under any contract or otherwise under law, to which the corporation shall
have recourse in such amount as the court having jurisdiction of such action
shall determine upon the termination of such action. The amount of such
security may thereafter from time to time be increased or decreased in the
discretion of the court having jurisdiction of such action upon showing that
the security provided has or may become inadequate or excessive.
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pose of avoiding the security-posting requirements appear correct. 60
In fairness to Professor Henn, it must be conceded that his
statement was apparently addressed to intervention under state
security statutes as an original proposition, rather than to any
federal court resolution of the problem. Thus, he is really criticizing the rule in force in New York's First Department, 6 1 and
not explicitly a federal decision to apply that state rule. The
important thing to note, therefore, is that one can still agree with
Henn, and at the same time accept the argument that state practice, right or wrong, as an abstract principle, should nevertheless
govern in the federal courts.
Neither Wright's view as to contemporaneity in general, nor
Henn's view as to intervenors specifically, has gone unchallenged.
Lattin, speaking on the contemporaneous ownership issue generally (i.e., not specifically addressing himself to the application of a
state rule by the federal courts), considers the minority rule allowing a noncontemporaneous owner to sue to be the "sounder"
view. 6 2 Quoting from Pollitz v. Gould,63 an early New York
decision, since overruled by statute, 64 he states:
A contrary rule prevails in many states, thereby permitting
a shareholder who acquired his shares other than by operation of law subsequent to the events upon which suit is
based to bring the action even in a case where he had knowledge of the transaction at the time he purchased the shares.
Thus, in the absence of special circumstances about to be
discussed, a shareholder is not barred simply by looking at
the time when he acquired his shares. This rule is thought to
be the sounder of the two and the reasons for so considering
it have been explained as follows: "A stockholder has an
indivisible interest in the property and assets of a corporation

subject to the discharge of its obligations. This indivisible
6
The impetus for enactment of the first security-for-expenses statute was Wood's
survey of stockholders' derivative suits prepared for the Special Committee on Corporate

Litigation, Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York. F. WOOD, SURVEY AND
REPORT REGARDING STOCKHOLDERS' DERIVATIVE SUITS ; (1944). The study, which
analyzed 693 New York shareholders' derivative suits, adverted to the fact that in most of

the cases involving public issue corporations, the plaintiffs' interest in the corporation was
so small as to suggest that many of the actions were brought in the interest of the attorney

rather than the ostensible client. Id. at 48. Therefore, an interpretation of the statute only
to require substantial holdings, whenever acquired, seems consistent with the purpose of
the statute.
61See note 3 1 supra.
62 LATTIN, supra note 2, at 422-23.

63 202 N.Y. 11, 94 N.E. 1088 (1911).
4The present statute embodying the principle that overruled the case is N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 626(b) (McKinney 1963).
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interest generally speaking is represented by certificates of
stock and is transferred by their transfer .... As an original
proposition it would seem to be clear that a right of action by
or in behalf of the corporation for fraud to set aside a conveyance of its assets or to avoid obligations imposed upon it
is part of its rights, property and assets in which a stockholder has this indivisible interest transferable by the transfer
of his certificates. I am unable to see any real or substantial
distinction by virtue of which a stockholder transferring his
certificates would transfer all of his indivisible interest in
bonds or real estate on hand, but would not transfer his
interest in a right of action to recover bonds or real estate
which had been fraudulently withdrawn from the possession
of the corporation, and which it was entitled to recover. And
if the subsequent holder by acquiring the certificates does
acquire such latter interest, it seems to follow that he may if
necessary, in behalf of the corporation, assert and prosecute
an action to protect and enforce the same." Arguments of the
practical inconvenience of determining whether the transferor
had participated in or ratified the transaction sued upon, or
that a shareholder buys shares subject to transactions preceding his purchase, or that the price of the share has been
adjusted to take into consideration prior transactions which
are the foundation of suits were rejected by the court.
The special circumstances mentioned above are that a
shareholder who has participated in or ratified the acts which
are the subject of the suit, or who has been guilty of laches in
failing to take action after discovery of them, is barred from
being a plaintiff in a derivative action. Some of the cases hold
that a transferee of such a shareholder, even though he has no
notice of what the previous owner has done, is barred from
suit because the shares carry with them the taint which would
have barred the former owner. This is contrary to the negotiability concept. Another line of cases believed to be preferable
permits the transferee, who has no notice at the time of
acquiring his shares of the events upon which successful suit
depends, to bring the action. The innocent transferee ought
not to be barred from bringing what, after all, is a corporate
cause of action; and, if the shares are negotiable which is now
the case, one who purchases them without notice of what the
previous owner has done should have all the advantages that
negotiability gives in other negotiable instrument legal controversies. 65
As to intervenors, Lattin also argues (understandably) that the
LA65-ITIN, supra note 2, at 422-23 (footnotes omitted).
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contemporaneous ownership requirement should not be superimposed on security-for-expenses statutes. He states:
As far as the security-for-expenses statutes are concerned,
their language and the reasons for their enactment would
appear to be inapplicable to intervening shareholders whether
intervention be to defend or prosecute on behalf of the corporate defendant. These statutes were aimed at discouraging
plaintiffs from bringing "strike" suits, not at intervention
which normally works toward frustrating such motives. 66
In this latter position he is joined by Professor Dykstra, who
says:
[l1f the plaintiff is able to marshall intervenors possessing
collectively $50,000 worth of security or five percent of any
class of stock outstanding, it seems unlikely that the policy
against "purchased grievances" would be seriously compromised. At least, the danger does not seem sufficient to
warrant the serious interference which a contemporaneous
ownership requirement would impose on "the more fundamental policy of allowing derivative suits as a check on the
transgressions of corporate management. "67
The most forceful argument in support of the proposed amendment to the Rule is found, however, in Moore's treatise. Ignoring
the question of the wisdom of allowing suit or intervention by
noncontemporaneous owners, Moore addresses himself solely to
the question of the validity of Rule 23.1 in the face of conflicting
state law. He decides that, in such circumstances, the Rule must
be regarded as substantive, and accordingly yield to a contrary
state rule. Explaining his conclusion, he says:
In reaching the above conclusion we have not overlooked
Hanna v. Plumer and the very strong presumption which it
creates in favor of the validity of a rule or a provision of a
rule because of the prima facie judgment of the Advisory
Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress that the questioned rule is proper. But, as noted above, original Rule 23(b)
was formulated by the original Advisory Committee and promulgated by the Supreme Court prior to Erie; and while the
original Rules were before Congress, both prior to and after
the Erie decision, the Congress would have had to be clairat 438 (citation omitted).
Dykstra, The Revival of the Derivative Suit, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 74, 93(1967)
(citation omitted). Criticism of state security-for-expenses statutes themselves has been
widespread. See BALLANTINE, supra note 2, at 374 andLATTIN, supra note 2, at 457 and
authorities cited therein. Attitudes toward intervention may, of course, be affected by
opinions on the overall wisdom of such statutes.
66Id.

67
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voyant to ferret out at that time a possible conflict between
the clause in question and Erie. When, for the first time, in
1946 the Advisory Committee seriously considered the matter ,the Committee concluded that it should not decide the
issue but that the matter had best be left to a litigated case;
and apparently the Supreme Court then acquiesced in that
recommendation. It is true that in the revision of 1966, original Rule 23(b) was amended in some formal respects and
carried forward as Rule 23.1, but neither then nor since has
the Committee, the Court, or Congress considered the matter. And hence we conclude that where there is a collision
between clause (1) and state law that the validity of clause (1)
is subject to challenge; and, of course, for reasons stated
above, in that event clause (1) should yield to state law. This
will not seriously maim Rule 23.1 for (a) a contra state rule
can be applied without emasculating the balance of the rule,
(b) the issue will not frequently arise for the law in most
states is in accord with clause (1), and (c) those who specialize in stockholder's suits can live with clause (1) and usually
need not challenge its validity.6 8
Thus the conclusion from "counting noses" of authorities pro
and con must at least be that the proposal for change should stand
on its own merits, rather than having to rely on the number of
people for or against the change.

III.

THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT:

RATIONALE

Adoption of the simple amendment proposed, which will make
the contemporaneous ownership requirement of Rule 23.1 subject
to state law, can be justified on three grounds: (a) to avoid the
constitutional infirmity of the present Rule as foreseen by the
Advisory Committee that proposed the Rule; 69 (b) to produce
consistency in treatment not only with that given under other
Federal Rules but, more importantly, between that given in state
and federal courts in the important matter of suits to redress
intracorporate wrongdoing; and (c) ultimately, therefore -the best

reason for any change - to do justice.
A. Validity
1.
68

The Erie Doctrine-There is a strong argument that Rule

MOORE, supra note 9,

23.1.15[21, at 23.1-67 to -68 (citations omitted). Cf. C.

WRIGHT &A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1829 (1972).

61 See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
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23.1 by ignoring state law governing the right of a shareholder to
sue, is unconstitutional under the Erie doctrine. The requirement
of contemporaneity in federal shareholder derivative actions was
first imposed long ago in the "untrammeled" pre-Erie period.
Except for incorporating the notice of settlement provision, and
making express the requirement of adequate representation,
present Rule 23.1 merely sets out in a "separate count" the
provisions contained in old Rule 23(b), i.e., makes no change in
the substance of that Rule. Accordingly, any infirmities in the old
70
Rule are carried over. Erie and the Rules Enabling Act, of
course, made it imperative to differentiate between matters of
substance, which had to be controlled by state law in diversity
cases, and those of procedure, which were the only proper province of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It is noteworthy that
the 1946 revisers of Rule 23(b) 71 conceded that the category into
which the Rule fitted was debatable, 72 i.e., whether it was constitutional or not!
The Supreme Court has never directly confronted this "debatable" question. 73 Under the "outcome determinative" test of
Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 7 4 the matter would seem to be
clearly substantive, since a noncontemporaneous plaintiff will lose
in the federal court, even though he might be victorious in the
state court.
Although Guaranty Trust answered negatively
the narrow question whether, when no recovery could be
had in a State court because the action is barred by the
statute of limitations, a federal court in equity can [nonetheless] take cognizance of the suit because there is diversity of
citizenship between the parties, 75
it laid down a test, later widely applied, under which "procedural"
state rules were held sufficiently "substantive" to mandate their
application by federal courts in diversity of citizenship actions
under the Erie doctrine.
In Guaranty Trust, after pointing out the impossibility of a rigid
"substance"- "procedure" dichotomy and conceding that the
70

Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064, as amended 28 U.S.C.§ 2072 (1966).

71 The 1946 Advisory Committee carried over the 1937 text of the Rule. See note II
supra.
72 MOORE, supra note 9,

73 Id.

23.1.01[4], at 23.1-16.

23.1.15[21, at 23.1-61. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541,

555-56 (1949).

74 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Compare, however, Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (security-for-expenses statutes not outcome determinative, but should be upheld as representing a strong state policy).

75 326 U.S. 107.
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"forms and mode of enforcing the right" may properly vary between federal and state courts, Justice Frankfurter continued:
Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived not from
the United States but from one of the States. When, because
the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident, such a right is
enforceable in a federal as well as in a State court, the forms
and mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally
enough, vary because the two judicial systems are not identic.
But since a federal court adjudicating a State-created right
solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is
for that purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it
cannot afford recovery if the right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations
is deemed a matter of "procedure" in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns merely the manner
and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by
the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is
a matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to
our problem, namely does it significantly affect the result of a
litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that
would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the
same parties in a State court?
It is therefore immaterial whether statutes of limitation are
characterized either as "substantive" or "procedural" in State
court opinions in any use of those terms unrelated to the
specific issue before us. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins was not an
endeavor to formulate scientific legal terminology. It expressed a policy that touches vitally the proper distribution of
judicial power between State and federal courts. In essence.
the intent of that decision was to insure that, in all cases
where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely because
of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of
the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the

same, so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court. The nub of the
policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that for the
same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident
litigant in a federal court instead of in a State court a block
away should not lead to a substantially different result. And
so, putting to one side abstractions regarding "substance" and
"procedure," we have held that in diversity cases the federal
courts must follow the law of the State as to burden of proof,
Cities Service Co. v. Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, as to conflict of
laws, Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313 U.S. 487, as to contrib-

utory negligence, Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117.
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And see Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754. Erie R. Co. v.

Tompkins has been applied with an eye alert to essentials in
avoiding disregard of State law in diversity cases in the federal courts. A policy so important to our federalism must be
kept free from entanglements with analytical or terminologi76
cal niceties.
He concluded:
Plainly enough, a statute that would completely bar recovery in a suit if brought in a State court bears on a
State-created right vitally and not merely formally or negligibly. As to consequences that so intimately affect recovery
or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should
77
follow State law.
Four years after the Guaranty Trust case was decided, the
Supreme Court extended its holding to make three other state
procedural rules binding in federal courts. In Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co.,78 the Court held a diversity action
barred by the Kansas statute of limitations, where the state statute
required service of process to commence the action, and this had
not been done within the time limit. The action was barred despite
the provision of Federal Rule 3 that an action is commenced on
the filing of the complaint, which in this case was done within the
time limit. Woods v. Interstate Realty CoY9 applied a Mississippi
statute barring suit on a contract by a foreign corporation which
had not appointed a process agent, even though the state statute
did not purport to invalidate the contract, but merely closed the
state courts to suit on it. The third case was Cohen v. Beneficial
Industrial Loan Corp.,8 0 in which the New Jersey security-for-expenses statute (law of the forum state, not of the state of
incorporation) was applied to bar a stockholder's suit, although
the plaintiff had met the qualifications of Rule 23.1 for a derivative action.
Thus, even if one accepts the argument that the contemporaneity requirement is procedural, state rules even more clearly
procedural than a subsequent shareholder's qualification to sue
have been held sufficiently substantive to demand their application under the Erie doctrine. The guiding principle has always

Id. at 108- 10
Id. at 110.
78337 U.S. 530
79337 U.S. 535
80 337 U.S. 541
76

(emphasis added).

77

(1949).
(1949).

(1949). See notes 32-37 and accompanying text supra.
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been that the outcome must be the same in federal court as in
state court."'
82
Under the more recent test evolved in Hanna v. Plumer,
phrased by the dissent as holding that a Federal Rule "arguably
procedural" equals "constitutional," the holding that Rule 23.1 is
constitutional might appear to be guaranteed. This does not necessarily follow, however, since Hanna reasserts the constitutional
status of the Erie doctrine, as opposed to the theory, which had
grown up in the interim, that Erie merely represented a rule of
desirable federal policy. Therefore, it would follow that a federal
intrusion into a subject genuinely substantive would be unconstitutional.83
Furthermore, Hanna reaffirms the Erie criterion of prevention
of forum-shopping, relying, in upholding the service under the
federal as opposed to the Massachusetts rule, on the fact that a
plaintiff would not choose between the federal and state court on

"IAlthough all of these decisions had the effect of federal door-closing, as opposed to a
rule allowing noncontemporaneous owners to sue, this would not seem a proper ground for
constitutional distinctions, and, in any event, is not one propounded by the decisions.
Certainly, too, neither Guaranty Trust nor the other cases discussed in the text are
distinguishable on the ground that Rule 23.1 embodies an overriding federal policy. since
the rule can hardly be elevated to the status of the constitutional provision involved in
Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1948) (A strong federal policy
against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts
prevents application of a state trier-of-fact rule.).
82 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (upholding service of process under Federal Rule 4(d) I). in a
diversity action, against an assertion that the service was void because it was not made in
accordance with the Massachusetts statute on the subject). The Court said that where the
question is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, if the rule is valid when measured
against the standards of the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitution. it is to be applied
regardless of state law. Just as Guaranty Trust's holding was correct. so also the Hanna
decision is clearly correct if the Federal Rules are to have any meaning. since a contrary
holding would have rendered those Rules nugatory, i.e., would have made federal practice
completely subservient to state procedural rules in any diversity action. The only problem
arises, as is usual with significant decisions of the Supreme Court. in applying the tests.
which were laid down to justify a particular result, to different factual situations.
83 The Court said:
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules. the question facing
the court is a far cry from the typical. relatively unguided Erie choice: The
court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule. and can refuse to do so
only if the Advisory Committee. this Court. and Congress erred in their
prima facie judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms
of the Enabling Act nor constitutional restrictions.
380 U.S. at 471 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). The Court concluded:
Erie and its offspring cast no doubt on the long-recognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though some of
those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules.
Id. at 473 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
The requirement of contemporaneous ownership in Rule 23.1 can well be regarded as
more than a mere "housekeeping rule.'" Further. the Court expressly qualifies its holding
as to the validity of the Federal Rules by reiterating the constitutional limitation. The
Advisory Committee's doubts about the constitutionality of the Rule are especially apposite because of the importance the Supreme Court attaches to the Committee's judgment
on the issue of validity. See MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.1 5[3]. at 23.1-67 to -68.
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the basis of the particular rules as to service of process. 8 4 Obviously, however, the plaintiff's choice of forum in a state allowing
noncontemporaneous owners to sue will be dictated by the
difference between the federal and state rules.8 5 Likewise, where
the real defendants, i.e., the directors, can do so, they will attempt
to remove a state court action to federal court where they can
secure dismissal under Rule 23. 1.86
Forum-shopping is, therefore, mandated by the present Federal
Rule. If the Rule is not raised to the level of unconstitutionality, it
is still clearly inconsistent with the policy of Erie. Conversely, the
proposed change will foster the policy of Erie by guaranteeing the
same treatment to subsequent shareholders whether the action is
8 7
brought in the state or federal court.
2. Rule-Making Power- As Justice Reed pointed out in Erie,it
was not necessary to decide that case on constitutional grounds. 88

Swift v. Tyson,89 with its federal common law theory, could simply have been overruled as an incorrect interpretation of the word
"laws" in the Rules of Decision Act. 90
Similarly, Rule 23.1, as interpreted, need not be castigated as
"unconstitutional" to be rendered invalid. As Hanna points out,
the Rule is still void if it exceeds the rule-making authority given
to the Court by Congress in the Rules Enabling Act.9 1 That Act
8 The restoration of Erie to constitutional status destroys any argument (See, e.g.,
Developments in the Law-Multi-party Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 874, 965 (1958)) that the Rule may be valid under the Enabling Act even though in
conflict with Erie principles. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 228-32. Justice Harlan,
concurring in the Hanna case, although (strangely) regarding security-for-expenses statutes as not outcome determinative, would uphold them on the ground that they represent a
strong state policy. 380 U.S. at 477-78 (Harlan, J. concurring). This rationale would seem
equally applicable to state rules allowing noncontemporaneous owners to sue.
8 The difference would exist except, of course, where the federal court disregards the
Federal Rule. See WRIGHT, supra note 28, at 319, for cases holding that the allegation of
contemporaneity need not be made where the state law would not require contemporaneity. Most courts, however, require compliance with the Federal Rule.
86The following cases have held that the contemporaneous ownership requirement
applies to removed actions: Winkelman v. General Motors Corp., 44 F. Supp. 960
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Lissauer v. Bertles, 37 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Jacobson v.
General Motors Corp., 22 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Hitchings v. Cobalt Cent.
Mines Co., 189 F. 241 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1910); Venner v. Great N. Ry., 153 F. 498
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907), affld, 209 U.S. 24 (1908). Contra, Earle v. Seattle, 56 F. 909
(C.C.D. Wash. 1893); Evans v. Union Pac. Ry., 48 F. 497 (C.C.D. Colo. 1893). See
generally
MOORE, supra note 9, at 23.1.22, at 23.1-351 to -352.
87
See generally MOORE, supra note 9. 23.1.15[2], at 23.1-57 to -68.
88304 U.S. at 90-92.
8941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
9028 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970) provides:
State laws as rules of decision. The laws of the several states, except where
the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions
in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.
91 380 U.S. at 471. See also note 83 supra.
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provides that "[s]uch rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
92
any substantive right..
As the Erie progeny demonstrate, 9 3 "substance" and "procedure" do not form a neat dichotomy. It is for this reason that the
decisions discussed above have found it necessary to attempt
standards of definition apart from the terms themselves. The
whole project may be futile, perhaps because the division is an
artificial one. It savors of isolating an Aristotelian "substance"
from its "accidents," a later conceptualism imposed on a system
which was, in the days of the original writs, completely "procedural."
If, however, the term "substance" is to have any meaning apart
from its pragmatic, operational one for Erie purposes, it must in
some sense partake of the idea of importance, emphasized by
94
Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Sibbach v. Wilson & Co.
Indeed, this emphasis on the importance of the matter is even
more clearly suggested by the term "substantive rights," used by
the Rules Enabling Act. It fairly evokes as its opposite, "mere
procedure."
If federal jurisdiction provides the only forum for enforcement
of a cause of action, only the most hair-splitting of distinctions
could conclude that a rule which closes that court's doors to a
plaintiff is not an abridgment of his "substantive rights." To
paraphrase the common law's maxim, if there is no remedy, there
is no right. In this sense, then, the Federal Rule must be regarded,
because of its drastic effect, as beyond the rule-making power
granted by Congress.
The proposed change will return the Rule to its proper scope
92

The Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). reads:
Rules of civil procedure for district courts. The Supreme Court shall have the
power to prescribe, by general rules. the forms of process, writs, pleadings.
and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts of the
United States in civil actions.
Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right and
shall preserve the right of trial by jury as at common law and as declared by
the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.
Such rules shall not take effect until they have been reported to Congress
by the Chief Justice at or after the beginning of a regular session thereof but
not later than the first day of May, and until the expiration of ninety days
after they have been thus reported.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect. Nothing in this title anything therein to the
contrary notwithstanding. shall in any way limit, supersede. or repeal any
such rules heretofore prescribed by the Supreme Court.
93
See, e.g., the discussion in Sampson v. Channell. 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940). cert.
denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940): Hanna v. Plumer. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
94312 U.S. I. 16-19 (1941) (upholding the validity of the physical examination rule.
Federal Rule 35).
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under the Rules Enabling Act. Furthermore, since the amendment
proposed here is only ameliorative and does not require a decision
on the true nature of the Rule, i.e., substantive or procedural,
there is no obstacle to utilization of the normal ex parte rule
amendment procedure. 95
B. Consistency
Although consistency is no longer a highly-prized virture, it is
at least worth mentioning that the proposed change will not only
produce a consistent interpretation of the contemporaneity requirement, by overruling those decisions which impose the requirement despite contrary state law,9 6 but will also make the first
portion of Rule 23.1 consistent with its second sentence and with
the general trend of federal law on capacity to sue in corporate
litigation.
The second sentence of Rule 23.1-again a carryover from
previous law-requires the complainant in a shareholder's derivative action to allege his efforts to secure redress from the directors
or the reasons for his failure to have done so. Since this allegation
is a universal requirement of state law? 7 there is no conflict
between the Federal Rule and state law. The Rule, however,
further requires allegation of the efforts made to secure redress "if
necessary from the shareholders. . . ." The "if necessary" language has ordinarily (although not universally)9 8 been interpreted
as meaning, "if necessary under state law." 99 If state law controls
9 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970). See note 92 supra.
96 Elkins v. Bricker, 147 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Kaufman v. Wolfson 136
F. Supp. 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Winkelman v. General Motors Corp.. 44 F. Supp. 960
(S.D.N.Y. 1942); Perrott v. United States Banking Corp., 53 F. ,Supp. 953 (D. Del. 1944);
Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 36 F. Supp. 1006 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 120 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1941);
Lissauer v. Bertles, 37 F. Supp. 881 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); Robbins v. Sperry Corp., I F.R.D.
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 319; Developments in the
Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874, 964-66 (1958).
97 N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS
(4th ed. 1968) states:
In all American jurisdictions. either by statute, court rule or judicial

decision, a stockholder must first exhaust his remedies within the corporation
by requesting the board of directors to take action to redress the wrong
unless such demand would be futile....
Id. at 803.
See also 13 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CORPORATIONS § 5963 (perm. ed. rev. vol.
1970) (citing cases from thirty-nine states): W. CARY,CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 905 (4th ed. 1969); HENN, supra note I,at 771; 19 AM. JUR. 2d Corporations

§ 540 (1965); 18 C.J.S. Corporations § 564 (1939); Note. Demand on Directors and
Shareholders as a Prerequisite to a Derivative Suit, 73HARV. L. REV. 746 (1960).
9
8See Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp.. 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 379
U.S. 841 (1964).
99
See, e.g., Carroll v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R.. 141 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1956);
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whether a demand must be made on the body of shareholders as a
condition precedent to suit, it is certainly anomalous to treat the
contemporaneous ownership requirement as a question of federal
law.
Furthermore, Rule 17(b), defining capacity to sue, expressly
incorporates state law.' 0 0 It is certainly incongruous to apply a
federal requirement to a shareholder bringing a suit for the benefit
of his corporation, when, if the corporation itself were suing, its
capacity to sue would be determined by state law. 1 1
10 2
Some other Federal Rules expressly incorporate state law,
while an even greater number, which are clearly more procedural
than Rule 23.1, have been made subject to state law by judicial
construction, at least as regards certain aspects of their interpretation. 0 3 An especially significant example, so clearly
procedural and, at the same time, so apposite to shareholder
derivative actions, is the prevailing judicial rule that a corporation's amenability to federal process is to be determined by state
criteria.' 0 4 Even more crucial, the question of who constitutes a
"shareholder" under Rule 23.1 is to be determined by state
law. 10 5 Clearly, consistency demands the application of state law
Pomerantz v. Clark. 101 F. Supp. 341 (D. Mass. 1951): Steinberg v. Adams. 90 F. Supp.
604 (S.D.N.Y. 1950): Toebelman v. Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 41 F. Supp. 334 (D.
Del. 1941). aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 130 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1942). See also WRIGHT.
supra note 38. at 318: Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in tile Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 874 (1958).
Moore suggests that it will be the law of the state of incorporation, rather than that of
the forum. which will be applied. MOORE, supra note 9. 23.1.19, at 23.1-258. Under their
choice of law rules, state courts might well look to the law of the state of incorporation in
this matter. But quacre if the federal court should not be expressly required to apply
whichever rule the state court of the forum state would. See Palmer v. Hoffman. 318 U.S.
109 (1943). This possibility might suggest that clarifying language might be added to the
Rule here as well.
100 FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b). See WRIGHT, supra note 38. at 296.
101Rule 17(b) states in part: "The capacity of a corporation to sue or be sued shall be
determined by the law under which it was organized."
102 See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 43(a).
103 See as to state statutes of limitations. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York. 326 U.S. 99
(1945): as to state law closing courtroom doors to particular litigants or claims. WRIGHT.
supra note 38. at 176: as to capacity to sue and substantive rights of members in class
actions. id. at 306: as to burden of proof. id. at 280: as to pleading substantive elements of
a cause of action. id. at 28 1:as to the availability of declaratory judgment where state law
prohibits it in a particular situation. id. at 451: as to privilege. id. at 414 (the law here is
confused): as to certain aspects of the interpretation of Rule 14 (third-party practice). id. at
335; Rule 18 (joinder of claims), id. at 343; Rule 20(a) (permissive joinder of parties). id. at
305 n. 24: Rule 25 (substitution of parties). id. at 338.
Most of the reported decisions even apply state law in determining the indispensability
of a party. See, e.g., Kuchenig v. California Co.. 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965). cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 985 (1966): United States v. Elfer. 246 F.2d 941 (9th Cir. 1957). The
analogy to the capacity of a shareholder to sue is obvious.
04 Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963): WRIGHT. supra note
38, at 268- 69.
"s Although many of the earlier cases used their own standards to determine who
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in the determination of a shareholder's capacity to sue under Rule
23.1.
While inconsistent treatment among the various Federal Rules
may be passed off as unimportant because of the possible differing
purposes behind those provisions, inconsistent interpretations
within Rule 23.1 itself should be avoided if for no better reason
than to eliminate additional confusion in this already highly complex subject area.10 6 Consistency becomes imperative when the
qualified as a "shareholder" (see H.F.G. Co. v. Pioneer Pub. Co., 162 F.2d 536 (7th Cir.
1947); Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Burnham, 67 F.2d 981 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 292 U.S.
630 (1933); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E.D. Ky. 1939),
aff'd, 127 F.2d 291 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 639 (1942)), some of the cases
decided before Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (see Gallup v.
Caldwell, 120 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1941); Bankers Nat'l Corp. v. Barr, 7 F.R.D. 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1945) ), and all of those decided after the Cohen case appear to follow state law
(see Rosenfeld v. Schwitzer Corp., 251 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Treves v. Servel,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Lowell Wiper Supply Co. v. Helen Shop, Inc.,
235 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); Marco v. Dulles, 177 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Milvy v. Adams, 16 F.R.D. 105 (S.D.N.Y.), cause remanded, 217 F.2d 647 (2d Cir.
1954); Steinberg v. Hardy, 90 F. Supp. 167 (D. Conn. 1950) ). See also RESTATEMENT OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS §

182 (1971).

It is not completely clear, however, which state's law will apply. Henn suggests that the
law of the forum should govern in determining who qualifies as a shareholder. HENN,
supra note 1, at 762. Moore suggests that although this is technically true, the forum
state's conflicts rule will normally require basing the decision on the law of the state of
incorporation. MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.17. at 23.1-153. Wright apparently agrees.
WRIGHT, supra note 19, at 319. Compare Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949) (applying the forum state's (New Jersey's) security-for-expenses statute
although the corporation was a Delaware corporation), with Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941) (holding that the
forum state's conflicts rules must be applied).
The matter is important, since the rules differ from state to state as to the right of an
equitable owner, as opposed to only the record owner, to sue. Compare, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 626(a) (McKinney 1962), and PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516(a) (1954)
allowing equitable owners to sue, with ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRp. ACT § 49 (enacted,
e.g., in WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08.460 (1965)), allowing only record owners the right to
sue.
To avoid these and any interpretive difficulties with regard to the proposed change, the
words "if necessary" could, throughout the Rule, be modified by adding "under the law
which the forum state would apply." See note I supra. Compare the somewhat ambiguous
conflicts rule as to interpleader in proposed 28 U.S.C. § 2363(c). S. 1876, 93d Cong., Ist
Sess. (1973).
'°6See, e.g., the problems caused in the area of shareholders' derivative actions by 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c):
(c) For the purposes of this section and section 1441 of this title [removal], a
corporation shall be deemed a citizen of any State by which it has been
incorporated and of the State where it has its principal place of business:
Provided further, That in any direct action against the insurer of a policy or
contract of liability insurance, whether incorporated or unincorporated, to
which action the insured is not joined as a party-defendant, such insurer shall
be deemed a citizen of the State of which the insured is a citizen, as well as of
any State by which the insurer has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business.
See also Anniston Soil Pipe Co. v. Central Foundry Co., 329 F.2d 313 (5th Cir. 1964);
Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850 (3d Cir. 1960); WRIGHT, supra note 38.
at 90-91; Note, Location of Corporation'sPrincipalPlace of Business, 47 IOwA L. REV.
1151 (1962); Comment, New Federal JurisdictionalStatute Achieves Early Success in
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undesirable consequences of the current interpretation of clause

(1) of the present Rule are considered.
It must be remembered that consistency between state and
federal treatment is the heart of the Erie doctrine. 10° Both the
"outcome determinative" and "prevention of forum-shopping"
slogans have as their bases the similar treatment of litigants in
both forums, which Erie holds is essential to the constitutional
08
guarantee of equal protection of the laws.'
Further, the obvious effect of the present inconsistency between federal and state practice as to derivative actions is federal
door-closing. Since the federal court may provide the only forum
that can acquire jurisdiction over all of the essential parties,
such door-closing may well mean that wrongdoing directors will
escape from liability, and consequently, that their corporation will
be denied justice. 10 9 When the practical consequences of inconsistent treatment are considered in the context of related state
Reducing Number of District Court Case Filings But Presents Interpretive Difficulties, 58
Colum. L. Rev. 1287 (1958); Comment, A Corporation's Principal Place of Business for
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 38 N.Y.U.L. REV. 148 (1963).
If the corporation's principal place of business is held to be in the same state as that of
which the plaintiff is a citizen, the action will of course fail to meet the diversity requirement. (28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)). This is only one of many hurdles the plaintiff must
overcome to bring his action in what may be the only forum able to adjudicate his
corporate claim, the federal court. See, as to the others, Kessler, Corporations and the
New Federal Diversity Statute: A Denial of Justice, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 239.
The new state statutes and rules on shareholder derivative actions are much more
explicit than was true in the past (see notes 123, 161 infra), and accordingly, collision
between the Federal Rule and these new provisions is more likely than before. The
consequence will undoubtedly be an increase in inconsistent interpretations not only
between state and federal court decisions, but even within Rule 23.1 itself, unless the Rule
is expressly
amended to apply state law, as proposed.
10 7 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467 (1965). The oft-cited Sampson v. Channell,
110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940), gives excellent advice to
federal judges, encouraging them to pretend that they are state court judges for Erie
purposes: "The theory is that the federal court in Massachusetts sits as a court coordinate
with the Massachusetts state courts to apply the Massachusetts law in diversity of
citizenship cases." 110 F.2d at 761.
108 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,
467, 469 (1965).
1o9 See N.

LATTIN, R. JENNINGS & R.

BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS-CASES AND MATE-

RIALS 797 (1968):
The problem is especially difficult in the case of an action brought in a state
court having no contemporaneous-ownership requirement and which is then
removed to a federal court by a defendant, the citizen of another state, on the
basis of diversity. If the rule is regarded as procedural and a federal court is
compelled to dismiss the action rather than remand to the state court, both
doors are closed and plaintiff may be deprived of a state-created ight. See
Venner v. Great Northern Ry., 209 U.S. 24 (1908). It seems artificial to say
that there is a case which may be removed, but that the complaint should be
dismissed for want of equity and not for want of jurisdiction. The case should
either be remanded to the state court or the state rule should be applied by
the federal court as a substantive equitable principle.
See also Ilsen, Recent Cases and New Developments in Federal Practice and Procedure,
16 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1,41-44 (1941).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 7:90

and federal statutes, the arguments for the proposed change become even stronger.
1. Security-for-Expenses Statutes-The greatest anomaly under the present Rule and the most cogent practical reason for the
proposed change is found in the rulings involving the contemporaneous ownership requirement as it relates to state security-for-expenses statutes.
As pointed out previously, the security-for-expenses statutes,
which a number of states have enacted, have as their purpose the
discouragement of "strike" suits. 11 0 Most are rationalized on the
basis that plaintiffs with holdings sufficient to satisfy the statutory
criteria are less likely to bring spurious suits. Assuming the validity of this theory, the time at which the plaintiffs acquired their
shares should be irrelevant."' Some courts have held this way,
but the federal courts have generally imposed the requirement of
contemporaneity on all intervenors. 112 Thus, even though a particular state will allow noncontemporaneous shareholders to intervene for the purpose of avoiding the statutory requirements,
the corresponding federal court will nonetheless require security
to be posted. This inconsistency in treatment is not mandated by
Rule 23.1.113
Further, such a result is inconsistent with the treatment of
intervenors generally, under which intervenors of right' 14 are not
even required to meet jurisdictional requirements," 5 e.g., diversity of citizenship. It has also been expressly held that an intervening shareholder in a derivative action is not required to
meet this jurisdictional requirement. 1 6 It is certainly inexplicable
for courts to require contemporaneity when the fundamental requirement of diversity can be ignored.
The federal court's requiring the posting of security where the
state court would not, is especially incongruous since the state
110

See notes 19- 21 and accompanying text supra.

111 See notes 25-26 and accompanying text supra.
112

See notes 26-28 and accompanying text supra.
113 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
114 Such status, under present Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a), only requires an "interest" in the
transaction, and a practical impairment of one's ability to protect that interest, unless it is
already adequately represented by existing parties. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 328.
115 See, e.g., Gaines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 434 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1970); Babcock &
Wilcox Co. v. Parsons Corp., 430 F.2d 531 (10th Cir. 1970); Smith Petroleum Serv. Inc.
v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 420 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1970); Hardy-Latham v. Wellons 415
F.2d 674 (4th Cir. 1968); Black v. Texas Empire Ins. Ass'n, 326 F.2d 603 (10th Cir.
1964); Formulabs, Inc. v. Hartley Pen Co., 318 F.2d 485 (9th Cir.),cert. denied, 375 U.S.
945 (1963); East v. Crowdus, 302 F.2d 645 (8th Cir. 1962); Kozak v. Wells, 278 F.2d 104
(8th Cir. 1960); WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 331.
'5 6See Himmelblau v. Haist, 195 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Weinstock v. Kallet,
II F.R.D. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 195 I);WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 331.
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security-for-expenses statutes would not apply at all in federal
courts were they not held to be substantive by the Supreme
Court. 11 7 Consistency would seem to dictate that the interpretation given these statutes by the courts of the very states
which enacted them should also be held substantive. This was the
rule even before Erie!1 8 Worse yet, the present judicial interpretation conflicts with the Erie rule, even as reinterpreted in
Hanna, since by allowing different results to be obtained in state
and federal courts, forum-shopping is provoked.
Frequently, state statutes setting forth security-for-expenses
rzquirements impose the contemporaneous ownership requirement in the same statute section. 119 It is particularly inappropriate
for the federal courts to take one portion of such a statute as
binding, while ignoring the balance, especially where these statutes, albeit not without ambiguity, indicate that intervenors are
not required to meet the contemporaneous ownership test, and
may be so interpreted by the courts of the state enacting them.
Unfortunately, the above interpretation can be even more disastrous when a choice of forum is not possible. Although recent
"long-arm" statutes' 2 0 have made state jurisdiction more available, there are still situations where it will be impossible to get
jurisdiction over all necessary parties l2 ' in any state court, with
the result that a state court suit is precluded. With a minor lapse
in 1958,122 the general federal policy has been to facilitate the
bringing of derivative suits in the federal courts. 2 3 The predominant interpret4tion of Rule 23.1 runs counter to that permissive policy by restricting access to the federal courts in situations where even state law would not bar suit by the plaintiff.
Furthermore, this imposition of the contemporaneity requirement on top of the state security-for-expenses statutes clearly
seems to conflict with the very purpose of most such statutes,
which is to prevent "strike" suits simply by making sure that the
plaintiffs have an adequate stake in corporation. And, it must be

7 Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
118

See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938);WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 223.
119See, e.g., statutes discussed in note 161 infra, except that of New York.
120 See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. tit. 110, § 17 (1968), the pioneer.
121 See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
12 2
Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554. § 2, 72 Stat. 415, amending 28 U.S.C.

§ 1332(c) (1970) (making a corporation not only a citizen of its state of incorporation but
also of the state where it has its principal place of business). Criticized in Kessler, supra

note
25.
12 3

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1401 (special venue provision) and 1695 (special service provisions). See also the post-1958 amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and FED. R. Civ. P.
4(e). allowing use of state long-arm statutes in federal courts.
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remembered, the Supreme Court has, by its Cohen decision, in
effect, held that state policy should control in this area.124
The addition of the language suggested here will result in uniform treatment of plaintiffs in state and federal courts in this vital
area. The inconsistencies and, more importantly, the injurious
consequences of the present construction of the Rule will thus be
overcome, at least in those states which give a sensible in-

terpretation to their security statutes.

25

2. Discrimination Against State-Created Claims-The exigency of amending Rule 23.1 appears most clearly when suit
under the Rule is contrasted with an action grounded on SEC rule
lOb-5. It has become fashionable to refer to rule lOb-5 as creating
a "federal corporation law,"' 1 26 and not without reason, since it is
fast becoming a substitute for the derivative action as a means of
redressing corporate mismanagement. The Supreme Court has
now given the stamp of approval to the growing number of lower
court cases which allow recovery for corporate waste under the
rule, by requiring only that the wrongdoing "touch" a securities

transaction in order to be actionable.

27

Inasmuch as every derivative action in a sense "touches" a
securities transaction, since the plaintiff must be a shareholder,
i.e., must have acquired some stock, greater displacement of de24

See the Cohen case supra note 117 and note 84 supra.
beneficial consequence of the addition of the suggested language will be the
resolution of a conflict as to whether the right of an equitable owner of shares to bring a
derivative action is to be determined by state or federal law. See MOORE, supra note 9.
23.1.17, (t 23.1-152 to - 153; WRIGHT, supra note 38. at 319. While the preferable rule
would be to allow an equitable owner to sue, this again is a matter on which state law
should control, if the desirability of the Erie rule is accepted. See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACT § 49 (1971), which limits the right to sue to holders of record in the same section that
imposes the security-for-expenses requirement. By pointing to state law as to a shareholder's status, the suggested change should guarantee congruity between state and federal
court treatment of equitable owners.
Federal Rule 23.1 refers only to suits by "shareholders or members." Recent statutes
(e.g,, N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626 (McKinney Supp. 1973), 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. § 49 (1971)) also expressly allow suit by holders of voting trust certificates, persons
who technically fall into neither category of shareholders, record or equitable. Again, by
pointing to state law, interpretive problems, otherwise bound to arise, will be obviated.
A number of other interpretive problems which come up under state security-for-expenses statutes, and which cannot be resolved by the inconsistent Cohen-contemporaneous rubric, would also be resolved by the proposed amendment adopting
state law. See, e.g., Amdur v. Meyer, 36 Misc. 2d 433, 233 N.Y.S.2d 15, aft'd, 17 App.
Div. 2d 571, 237 N.Y.S.2d 352, aff'd, 13 N.Y.2d 1089, 196 N.E.2d 63, 246 N.Y.S.2d
408 (1963) (effect of sale of some of plaintiff's shares bringing him below statutory
minimum); Sorin v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 408, 220 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup. Ct.
1961) (effect of fall in value of plaintiff's shares below statutory minimum); Tyler v. Gas
Consumers Ass'n, 34 Misc. 2d 947, 229 N.Y.S.2d 169 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (whether plaintiff
who meets contemporaneous ownership requirement but does not hold sufficient shares
can avoid posting security by purchase of additional shares).
126 ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE,at xvii, 11 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
127 Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971).
1

125 Another
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rivative actions by "the federal corporation law" is inevitable. It
should be noted in this connection that the new Federal Securities
Code, at least as presently proposed, will do nothing to prevent
this expansion of rule lOb-5 into the derivative area. Although
Professor Loss, the draftsman of the Code, disclaims any express
intent to give a mere holder a private right of action solely from
his being a shareholder, 128 he adds, in referring to the application
of the Code to corporate mismanagement in general, that "the
pattern of this draft is to codify a good deal of the implied liability
that has developed but not to foreclose further evolution on a
case-by-case basis."

129

Today, skilled practitioners in this area usually try to frame
their complaints in terms of a violation of rule lOb-5 in order to
secure the many advantages of section 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,130 adding the common law derivative claim
merely as backup insurance in case the rule IOb-5 claim fails for
some reason. The contrast between the procedural advantages of
a rule lOb-5 action, and the burdens of an ordinary derivative suit
is striking: in the rule lOb-5 action, diversity of citizenship is not
required; 13 1 venue may be laid in the district where "any act or
transaction constituting the violation occurred," or in which the
' ' 13 2
defendant is "found or is an inhabitant or transacts business;
process may be served in any other district where the defendant
13 3
"is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be found;
1 34
state security-for-expenses statutes do not apply;
and apparently no demand on shareholders is necessary even though state law
would require one. 135 It is not inconceivable that much of the
impetus for judicial expansion of the scope of rule 10b-5 has come
from the courts' realization that unless suit is allowed under that
rule, the plaintiff will be effectively denied justice because of his
inability to hurdle the numerous obstacles in an ordinary deriva136
tive action.
128
ALI FEDERAL SECURITIES CODE § 1301. Comment (2)(b) at 33 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1973).
129Id. § 225, Comment 3(a) at II; § 1423. Comments 5(d), 6 at 187.
130See notes 13 1-135 and accompanying text infra.
131Securities Exhange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970).

132ld.
33
1 Id.
134 McClure v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 939
(1961). See alsoJ. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Epstein v. Solitron Devices,

Inc., 388 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1968); Phelps v. Burnham, 327 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1964);
Fielding v. Allen, 181 F.2d 163 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 817 (1950); Mintz v.
Allen, 254 F. Supp. 1012 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
35
1 See Levitt v. Johnson, 334 F.2d 815 (ist Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961 (1965),
(decided under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1-80b-21(1970)).
13

6See J. I. Case v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, (1964), giving this as a justification for
expansion of Securities Exhange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970).
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Academic commentators, until recently, have applauded the
macro-evolution of rule lOb-5. 13 7 Now, however, some are beginning to have second thoughts, 13 8 which, if officially adopted,
would severely curtail the utility of the rule as a substitute for the
derivative suit. Undoubtedly there is even stronger opposition to
expansion of the rule among corporation lawyers. If the opponents of the federal corporation law are to succeed in stopping its
spread, it would seem essential to provide a viable substitute
based on state law. Access to federal court as a forum for enforcement of such state law claims is also essential because of the
jurisdictional limitations of state courts.
Perhaps more sweeping changes, e.g., abolition of state security-for-expenses statutes, will be necessary if the states are to
regain control over the substantive law to be applied to their
corporations. At the very least, artificial federal impediments to
state law actions must be removed if the derivative action is to
offer a palatable alternative to an expanding federal securities law.
Accordingly, the changes proposed, which will require the federal
courts to apply plaintiff-oriented state rules, are fundamental to
any campaign to revitalize state corporation law.
But, whatever the outcome of the battle between state and
federal corporation laws, the anomaly between the treatment in a
single case of the federal claim under rule lOb-5, and the
state-created shareholder derivative claim (which, in order to be
"pendent," i.e., to avoid the diversity requirements, must arise
from a "common nucleus of operative facts" 13 9 with the federal
one) is unjustifiable. In the absence of overriding federal policy,
subjecting what is basically the same claim to more onerous
requirements than the state itself would impose, merely because it
140
is state-created, smacks of a denial of due process.
3. Prevention of Collusive Suits- It should be noted that the
proposed change does no violence to the generally accepted purpose of Federal Rule 23.1. The genealogy of the Rule has been
traced: 14 1 Rule 23.1 is substantially equivalent to old Rule 23(b).
137 See, e.g., Lowenfels. The Demise of the Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era ]or Rule
lOb-5, 54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968).
138See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD-SEC RULE l0b-5 § 8.4 (1967);

Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulpur- The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5
Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423, 444 (1968). See also H. MANNE,
INSIDER TRADING IN THE STOCK MARKET (1966). Professor Manne would apparently

sweep aside even the more traditional rule lOb-5 liability.
139
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
14 0 Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson. 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969), and cases cited therein.
141See generally MOORE, supra note 9, 23. 1.01 [1],
at 23.1-11, 23.1.01[4], at 23,1-12 to
-16, 23.1.15[l]. at 23.1-51 to -55, 23.1.15[2), at 23.1-57 to -68. A comprehensive discussion of Rule 23.1 is also found in C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CIVIL §§ 1821-41 (1972). See also BALLANTINE, supra note 2. at 357-58.
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Rule 23(b) was basically the same as Equity Rule 27,142 which, in
turn, was sired by Equity Rule 94,143 a codification (at the same
14 4
term of court) of the rule laid down in Hawes v. Oakland.
Hawes makes it clear that the basic purpose of the Rule was to
prevent collusive suits, which were designed to confer federal
jurisdiction where it would not otherwise be available. 145 But this
purpose is adequately served by the second clause of the Rule,
which requires the plaintiff to swear "that the action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States
which it would not otherwise have," and even more so by the
parallel statute, which withholds federal jurisdiction from collusive suits. 14 6 In fact, the anti-collusion law can, with some justification, be said to make both the first and second clauses of Rule
23.1 unnecessary, insofar as their object is to prevent collusively
conferred federal jurisdiction. 14 7 This is especially true because of
the vigorous interpretation which has recently been given to the
1 48
anti-collusion statute.
142 Equity Rule 27 was promulgated at 226 U.S. 656 (1912).
143MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.01[41,at 23.1-13.
144104 U.S. 450 (1882). See HENN, supra note 1.at 752.

4 According to Ballantine, before the decision in Hawes v.Oakland,
[i]t became a practice, in order to get such cases [where diversity would not
exist if the corporation brought the suit itselfl into the federal courts. to
arrange either to have a non-resident shareholder sue the corporation, or if
there was no non-resident shareholder, to have a few shares transferred to a
non-resident who would, upon formal refusal of the board of directors to act,
bring a derivative suit in the federal courts.
BALLANTINE, supra note 2, at 357. See N. LATTIN, R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM,
CORPORATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS 786-88 (4th ed. 1968); WRIGHT, supra note 38,

at 319; HENN, supra note 1.at 766. Oddly enough, state rules requiring contemporaneous
ownership were patterned after the federal rule.
It has been argued that the anti-collusion purpose of the Rule had behind it the further
purpose of preventing forum-shopping. See Note. 45 CALIF. L. REV. 80. 82 (1957). If so.
as the author of the Note points out, its rationale disappeared with the Erie decision. It
must, however, be conceded that today, prohibitions against collusively conferring federal
jurisdiction have an additional basis: cutting down, generally, the caseload in the federal
courts.

Compare MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.15[2], at 23.1-57. Moore states that the reasons
underlying the reauirement are not clear, and although he concedes that there is support
for the noncollusion argument, he seems to regard the basis of the rules to be "substantive
equitable principles which would estop a shareholder to question transactions which
occurred prior to his becoming a shareholder." Id. at 23.1-60. This interpretation seems to
rely on later case justifications for the rule, rather than the original impetus for its
promulgation. Of course, if the Rule is, for whatever reason, "substantive," it becomes
unconstitutional under the Erie doctrine, and, it should be noted, Moore so argues. Id.
'46 28 U.S.C.§ 1359. See WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 99- 100. See also proposed 28
U.S.C.
§ 1307 (S.1876, 93d Cong., IstSess. (1973)).
14 7
The Rule's requirement of verification of the allegation of contemporaneity and
noncollusion is not likely to add much to the force of the statutory provision. See Surowitz
v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S. 363, rehearing denied, 384 U.S. 915 (1966).
148See Kramer v. Caribbean Mills, Inc., 394 U.S. 823 (1969); Lester v. McFaddon. 415
F.2d 1101 (4th Cir. 1969); McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968). cert. denied,
395 U.S. 903 (1969); Gilchrist v. Strong, 299 F. Supp. 804 (D. Okla. 1969). See generally,
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If the first clause of Rule 23.1 is taken, as some cases have
suggested, as reflecting not merely an attitude against collusively
conferred federal jurisdiction, but also as an additional federal
equity policy barring litigation of "purchased claims,"' 149 this policy, which seems clearly substantive,' 5 0 should yield in the federal
courts in favor of state-federal uniformity, 15 1 in that minority of
states which have not chosen to adopt the policy, or at 2least do
5
not choose to apply it in the security-for-expenses area.'
C. Justice
The results of the failure to follow the policy of Erie and
inconsistency are the same: possible unavailability of any court to
adjudicate the plaintiff's claim. It is the purpose of the proposed
change to rectify this denial of justice.

ALl,

STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION

BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS

22-23, 153-61 (1969);WRIGHT, supra note 38, at 100-02.

149 See, e.g., Dimpfell v. Ohio & M. R.R., 110 U.S. 209 (1884); Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 555-56 (1949); Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Barber, 67 Neb.
644, 93 N.W. 1024, 1029 (1903); Jepsen v. Peterson, 69 S.D. 388, 10 N.W.2d 749 (1943);
supra note 9, 23.1.1512], at 23.1-58.
MOORE,
15 0
'

51

See WRIGHT. supra note 38, at 242.
See MOORE, supra note 9, 23.1.1512], at 23.1-68.

Obviously, any such policy of the Rule is satisfied when the original plaintiff meets the
contemporaneous ownership requirement, and, thus. the judicial gloss imposing the requirement on intervenors as well seems clearly unwarranted. However, since the language
of the proposed amendment would have a broader application, i.e., not restricted to
intervention, any such federal equity policy would conflict with the Rule as amended,
unless the state had a similar policy.
Since the present Rule has its more undesirable effects in cases involving intervention in
the security-for-expenses area, an amendment, more limited in scope but more cumbersome in language, might suggest itself. A new sentence, before the final one of the present
Rule might read: "In the application of any security-for-expenses statute or Rule of the
forum state, intervention shall be permitted under the circumstances in which it would be
permitted by the courts of said state in the district in which the federal court sits."
The later language is necessary in order to accommodate such states as New York,
where the permissibility of intervention by noncontemporaneous owners to avoid the
security-for-expenses statute differs from department to department. Compare, e.g., Perry
v. Shahmoon Indus., Inc.. II Misc. 2d 137, 172 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct.). aff d mem. 6
App. Div.2d 1010, 178 N.Y.S.2d 612 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 7 App. Div.2d 634, 179
N.Y.S.2d 846 (1st Dep't 1958). and Noel Associates v. Merrill, 184 Misc. 646, 53
N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1944), representing the First Department view that noncontemporaneous owners may intervene, with Breswick & Co. v. Harrison-Rye Realty Corp., 280
App. Div. 821, 114 N.Y.S.2d 25 (2d Dep't 1952) and Richman v. Felmus. 8 App. Div. 2d
985, 190 N.Y.S.2d 920 (2d Dep't 1959). exemplifying the contrary Second Department
practice. The bill which became the New York Business Corporation Law, as originally
introduced (A. Int. 885, Pr. 885. § 6.26(d) (1961)), would have expressly enacted the Noel
(First Dep't) rule, but unfortunately the provision was deleted in the law as finally enacted,
leaving the matter in the realm of case law determination. New York's highest court has
not52yet resolved the conflict.
1 See HENN, supra note 1,at 766.
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PRACTICAL

PROBLEMS

OF THE PROPOSED

AMENDMENT

It has been assumed here that the addition of the words "if
necessary" would result in incorporation of state law into Rule
23.1. As already pointed out, most of the few cases interpreting
the expression in terms of the shareholder demand requirement of
the Rule have so held.' 5 3 At least one case, however, has apparently held that federal law would control on the issue of the
15 4
necessity for making such a demand.
Abstractly, it would be desirable to abolish the requirement of a
demand on the shareholders completely. Federal courts, applying
their own standard, might be more apt to excuse the demand than
their counterpart state courts. 5 5 Obviously, however, the proposed change in the contemporaneous ownership provision will be
of no value if the phrase "if necessary" is not referred to state
law. Since the added words will almost surely be given the same
interpretation as they have been given in the old context, it is
necessary to overrule any anti-state law interpretation given to the
expression in the shareholder demand sentence, in order to guarantee the proper construction of clause (1). Fortunately, a reviser's comment will probably be sufficient to accomplish the desired interpretation, in the event that the proposed change is made.
The principal problem, should the proposal to incorporate state
law into the contemporaneity requirement be adopted, will come
in trying to determine the state law which must be applied. The
right vel non of a subsequent shareholder to sue will not pose
much of a problem because of the significant amount of state
statutory and case law on the subject.' 5 6 The same cannot be said,
however, for the determination of whether subsequent shareholders will qualify as intervening plaintiffs. Under a security-for-expenses statute like California's, which allows the court
to compel the plaintiff or plaintiffs to post security regardless of
the amount of their holdings,' 5 7 the problem is of little signifi13 See note 99 supra.

Meltzer v. Atlantic Research Corp.. 330 F.2d 946 (4th Cir.). cert. denied, 379 U.S.
841 (1964).
155See, e.g., Levitt v. Johnson. 334 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1964),cert. denied, 379 U.S. 961
(1965).
156See also Hirshfield v. Briskin, 447 F.2d 694, 698 (7th Cir. 1971), liberally interpreting Rule 23.1 to allow suit by a shareholder, under the devolution by operation of
law provision, despite elements of a sale (which would have debarred plaintiff as a
noncotitemporaneous shareholder). HENN, supra note I. at 766; See MOORE, supra note 9.
23.1.1512], at 23.1-58 n.6; R. STEVENS, CORPORATIONs 812 (2d ed. 1949).
154

157

CAL. CORP. CODE § 834 (West 1955).
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cance. Similarly, under a statute like Pennsylvania's, where a
plaintiff can be excused from posting security where the posting of
such security "would impose undue hardship on plaintiffs and
serious injustice would result." 1 58 - the permissibility of intervention also becomes less important.
The typical security-for-expenses statute, however, sets an arbitrary financial interest which the plaintiff or plaintiffs must pos159
sess in order to avoid the necessity for posting such security,
and in effect makes the posting of security mandatory upon demand of the corporate defendant. 160 Unfortunately, also, such
statutes typically do not indicate whether subsequent shareholders qualify to meet the requisite share ownership amount and
thus to excuse imposition of the security liability.' 61
158 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1516 (1967).
159See note 19 supra.
16oSee, e.g., ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 49: "'[The corporation ...

shall be

entitled.., to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give security .... See also N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 627, and other statutes cited in note 19 supra.
161 The New York Business Corporation Law. as introduced in 1961, would have been
explicit, but the provision was excised on final enactment. See note 58 supra. Unfortunately, even the Model Business Corporation Act is not without ambiguity. Section 49 of the
Model Act provides:
Provisions Relating to Actions by Shareholders-No action shall be brought
in this State by a shareholder in the right of a domestic or foreign corporation
unless the plaintiff was a holder of record of shares or of voting trust
certificates therefor at the time of the transaction of which he complains, or
his shares or voting trust certificates thereafter devolved upon him by operation of law from a person who was a holder of record at such time.
In any action hereafter instituted in the right of any domestic or foreign
corporation by the holder or holders of record of shares of such corporation
or of voting trust certificates therefor. the court having jurisdiction, upon final
judgment and a finding that the action was brought without reasonable cause.
may require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to pay to the parties named as defendant
the reasonable expenses, including fees of attorneys, incurred by them in the
defense of such action.
In any action now pending or hereafter instituted or maintained in the right
of any domestic or foreign corporation by the holder or holders of record of
less than five percent of the outstanding shares of any class of such corporation or of voting trust certificates therefor. unless the shares or voting trust
certificates so held have a market value in excess of twenty-five thousand
dollars. the corporation in whose right such action is brought shall be entitled
at any time before final judgment to require the plaintiff or plaintiffs to give
security for the reasonable expenses. including fees of attorneys, that may be
incurred by it in connection with such action or may be incurred by other
parties named as defendant for which it may become legally liable. Market
value shall be determined as of the date that the plaintiff institutes the action
or. in the case of an intervenor, as of the date that he becomes a party to the
action. The amount of such security may from time to time be increased or
decreased, in the discretion of the court, upon showing that the security
provided has or may become inadequate or is excessive. The corporation
shall have recourse to such security in such amount as the court having
jurisdiction shall determine upon the termination of such action, whether or
not the court finds the action was brought without reasonable cause.
It should be noted that the first paragraph requires contemporaneous record ownership
by "the plaintiff " (or his predecessor if the plaintiff received his shares by operation of
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The few state cases which have passed on the subject have not
reached consistent results. 162 Most states apparently have not
decided the question. The problem for federal courts applying
state law is difficult enough where they have only lower court
decisions on which to rely; 163 the difficulties are compounded

where there are no relevant decisions whatsoever.
The problem is, however, not infrequently faced by federal
courts.' 6 4 The task of the federal judge is really the same as that

of his state court
court will decide
trine itself is to
objection to the
under the Rule.

counterpart, i.e., to predict how the highest state
the case, and, accordingly, unless the Erie docbe condemned, such task constitutes no real
proposed additional incorporation of state law

V.

CONCLUSION

The proposed change in Rule 23.1 is designed to make its
contemporaneous share ownership requirement yield to contrary
state rules in the few jurisdictions where noncontemporaneous
owners are allowed to commence derivative actions, and, more
importantly, to allow intervention by noncontemporaneous owners, where state law allows, to permit the plaintiffs to escape the
requirement of posting security for expenses.
law), but in the security-for-expenses portion, the statute refers to the "plaintiff or
plaintiffs" being allowed to meet the necessary holding requirements, and expressly provides for intervenors, but only on the question of determining the value of the shares used
to escape the security posting.
The enacted statutes which excuse security posting where certain percentage or value
requirements are met are almost all equally ambiguous. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 608.131
(1956) (subsection (1) requires "plaintiff" to be a contemporaneous owner, subsection (3)
allows corporation to demand security where "plaintiff or plaintiffs" own less than 5
percent, or their shares are not in excess of $50,000 (no reference to intervenors) ); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6 (1969) (subsection I requires contemporaneous ownership by
"plaintiff," subsection 3, concerning security-for-expenses, refers to "plaintiff or plaintiffs"
(no reference to intervenors)); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 626(a) (1963) (requires "plaintiff"
to be contemporaneous, while § 627(a) refers to "plaintiff or plaintiffs" not holding 5
percent or over $50,000 value (silent as to intervenors)); WASH. REV. CODE § 23A.08-460
(1965) (similar to Model Act).
Although PA. STAT. ANN. § 1516 a (1954) provides that "the plaintiff or plaintiffs must
aver and it must be made to appear, that the plaintiff or each plaintiff was a shareholder .... " it allows the court to waive the requirement completely.
162 See 2 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 4.25 (1971).
63
1 See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field. 311 U.S. 169 (1940). in which the federal
court in New Jersey was ordered to follow two New Jersey Chancery Court decisions.
which, after the federal court decision. New Jersey's highest court repudiated. Hickey v.
Hahl, 129 N.J. Eq. 233, 19 A.2d 33 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941).
164 See WRIGHT. supra note 38. at 240. The most satisfactory solution, if the state courts
cooperate, is for the federal court to ask the highest court of the state what the state law is.
See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207 (1960). questions answered, 133 So. 2d 735
(Fla. 1961); F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE42 (1965); Vestal, The Certified Question of
Law, 36 IOWA L. REV. 629, 643 (1951).
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Although there is respectable authority supporting the present
Rule and its interpretation, it is submitted that this subjection of
the Federal Rule to state law, even if not mandated by the
Constitution, is nevertheless advisable for several reasons. Not
only will the change produce internal consistency within Rule
23. 1, consistency of interpretation with other Rules and with the
substantive characterization given to state security-for-expenses
statutes, but it will also better serve the policy of Erie by ensuring
the same treatment to plaintiffs in federal as in state courts. More
importantly, the change is warranted in order that the plaintiff not
be denied, on a technicality, what is frequently the only available
forum in which justice can be secured for his corporation.

